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 Introduction: Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political 
Development 
Reflecting back on the seven long decades since the division of Korea, the two nations, sharing a 
united culture, history, race and language, continue to be separated. This paper addresses the 
question of how reunification between North Korea and South Korea can be achieved.  
1.1. Research Aim 
Reunification is a long process of overcoming mistrust and enhancing mutual understanding for 
the purposes of a peace settlement. Painful memories of the Korean War brought distrust and 
enmity among the Koreans. However, hope for one nation, inherited from the same ancestry, led 
Korea to take steps towards reunification.  
The Korean reunification can only be achieved through step-by-step process and a long-term 
cooperation that ensures that the populations on both sides have sufficient time to rebuild a 
common identity and that their economies converge enough to make a reunification possible.1 
Building a new national society in Korea after reunification will probably be more difficult than 
political unification regardless of how it is achieved. This is because the two Koreas have 
developed significantly different having divergent values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours 
within their major social institutions over the generations since national division.2  
The aim of this paper is to understand the issues that occurred between North Korean and South 
Korean relations, thereby providing answers on how reunification of the two countries can be 
peacefully achieved. It will do so by looking at the history of Korean relations and examine why 
the peace negotiations among them failed. Looking at both Korean perspectives as well as 
looking at the thoughts of Ri Song Chol, the Secretary General of Korean Association of Social 
Scientists, and the thoughts of Yong Man Jo, the North Korean Ambassador in South Africa,  a 
                                                     
1 Niederhafner, S., 2013. "The Challenges of Reunification: Why South Korea Cannot Follow Germany's Strategy." Vol. 44, No. 2.  
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bZE1iN8nDWEJ:www.iks.or.kr/renew/addition/download.asp%3Fftype%3Dissue%26ft
b%3Dhm_issue_tb%26idx%3D1289+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za. Accessed on April 20, 2014. pp. 249-287. 
2 Chamberlin, P.F., 2004. "Cultural Dimensions of Korean Reunification: Building a Unified Society," in International Journal on World Peace, 
Vol. 21, No. 3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753448. Accessed on March 11, 2014. p. 4. 
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preliminary could begin to fix the Korean nations attitudes towards reunification. Thereafter, 
examining the reunification processes that of Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen, a clear 
understanding of the precautions Korea should take prior to the emergence of reunification. 
Considering North Korea's economy, South Korea's main priority should be to enhance North 
Korea's economic development. Weighing out these measures, this paper then provides possible 
scenarios for Korea to achieve a successful reunification. Regardless of the scenarios that drive 
reunification, this paper makes the point that each scenario would bring different challenges and 
beginnings towards reconciliation. 
This paper is divided into eight chapters:  
Chapter Two gives a preliminary descriptive examination of the Korean history and how the 
Korean Peninsula divided, starting from colonisation of Korea by Japan. This chapter looks at 
the Korean peace talks and policies that were implemented to bring reconciliation among the 
Koreans. In order to understand the basis of the problem of North Korea-South Korea relations, 
this chapter outlines the differences of the Korean governments. 
Chapter Three explores disparities in unification policies of the two different systems, ideologies 
and beliefs in Korea. This chapter also provides a survey of the North Korean refugees and the 
South Korean refugees in China on the issue of reunification. This review helps us to understand 
the thoughts of both the Koreans on the issue of unification.  
Chapter Four attempts to pursue an ideal political and economic process as well as conditions 
which will allow Korea to achieve successful reunification. After studying the reunification 
experiences of three reunited countries, namely; Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen, it is concluded 
that some political, economic, and social factors play a vital role in laying down an ideal process 
towards successful Korean reunification.  
Chapter Five examines four different scenarios, such as; unification by step-by-step, unification 
by absorption, unification by conflict, and unification by external intervention, to overcome the 
problems of prior Korean reunification processes. These scenarios could unfold depending on the 
context in which some economic, political, and military events occur. For this reason, unification 
could happen with few early signs, or it could be delayed for years or even decades. 
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Chapter Six examines the challenges likely to be faced by a reunified Korean Peninsula. 
Considering the quality of life between the two Koreans, this chapter provides future prospects 
of reunified Korea which allows us to question whether post-reunification process will be 
successful. Moreover, it allows us to question whether or not a unified Korea would 
economically survive in the world. Despite the conditions that drive reunification, it makes the 
point that each scenario would bring unique challenges, costs and starting points. 
After examining the history behind North Korea and South Korea relations and the influence of 
the big powers in the region, Chapter Seven provides recommendations on how to improve the 
Korean relations. These prospects for the future can help both the Koreas to make the right 
decision and come to terms by going back to their origins and finding common identity. Last but 
not least, Chapter Eight provides final remarks tying up the discussion made throughout the 
paper.  
To date there has not been much documented research on the topic of this research study 
internationally or within South Africa. Therefore, this study which investigated how 
reunification between North Korea and South Korea can be achieved could make a significant 
contribution in this regard. Korean reunification is important to the world mainly because North 
Korea's nuclear development programme could be fixed by the reunification of the two countries 
thereby withdrawal of the United States (US) troops from the Korean Peninsula. Reunified Korea 
could gain dominant position in the region and in the world by being an economic powerhouse, 
where most of trade can pass through the East Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea. Having peaceful 
Korea could thus allow Korea to freely insert its own objectives in the geo-strategically 
important location.  
 
This paper argues that reunification is the only viable long term solution for both North Korea 
and South Korea and that status quo is not the most ideal solution. Status quo could shift Korea 
far from reunification and closer to the unpleasant options of starting nuclear warfare and 
acquiring more nuclear arsenal. 
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The Beginning: Fight Over One Land 
This chapter gives a preliminary descriptive examination of the Korean history and how the 
Korean Peninsula divided starting from colonisation of Korea by Japan. It further explores the 
question by providing a process tracing of the Korean peace talks and policies (such as the Basic 
Agreement (1991), the Inter-Korean Summit (2000), the Sunshine Policy (1998-2007), and the 
Six-Party Talks (2003-2007)) that were implemented to bring reconciliation between the Koreas. 
By looking at these peace talks, one can see the inconsistency of the Korean relations and the 
unpredictable nature of the North Korean government. In order to understand the basis of the 
problem of North Korea-South Korea relations, this section clearly outlines the differences of the 
North Korean and the South Korean regimes. 
2.1. Historical Background of Korea's Division 
An independent empire for much of its long history, Korea was annexed by Japan in 1905 after 
the Russo-Japanese War. In 1910, Japan officially occupied the entire peninsula.3 Following the 
World War II and the capitulation of Japanese Empire, the influence of the US and Soviet Union 
(USSR) divided Korea into two different countries by the 38th Parallel on August 15, 1945.4  
This line was implemented to divide Korea temporarily until a sovereign government could be 
formed. The US and the USSR failed to come to a mutual understanding on a unified Korean 
government, in which the beginning of the Cold War led to the start of two separate 
governments. A US democratic rule in Seoul in South Korea (ROK) under Syngman Rhee and a 
USSR communist rule in Pyongyang in North Korea (DPRK) under Kim Il-sung.5 Two 
contrasting ideologies were implanted into the minds of Koreans, which were to become the 
seeds of the long conflict between the Koreans. 
On June 25, 1950, the Korean war between the two Koreas broke with the North Korean forces 
along with USSR and China occupying the southern half of the peninsula to reunify Korea under 
                                                     
3 North Korea. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html. Accessed on November 23, 2014. 
4 The Korean War. http://americainthekoreanwar.weebly.com/korea-divided-at-the-38th-parallel-after-wwii.html. Accessed on September 25, 
2014.  
5 The editors of encyclopædia of Brittanica. 38th parallel. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/592578/38th-parallel. Accessed on  
February 22, 2014. 
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communism (see Figure 1).6 The US intervened fearing that a communist takeover of Korea 
could have wider implications for the US.7 The war lasted until the Armistice Agreement on July 
27, 1953.8  
The Armistice Agreement was signed by Mark W. Clark (U.S. Army General and commander of 
the U.N.), Peng De-Huai (commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers) and Kim Il-sung 
(Supreme commander of the Korean People's Army).9 South Korea refused to sign it because 
President Syngman Rhee did not agree to the armistice and instead insisted on unification 
through conquering the communist North by force. The armistice hardened the division of the 
Korean Peninsula.10 Hence, opposing ideologies (Communism versus Capitalism) were a key 
factor of the division of Korea, under the influence of the two Cold War superpowers. Although 
the Cold War has ended, Korea remains divided into two opposed regimes by a heavily equipped 
De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) and represents one of the last remnants of the Cold War legacy.11 
12 
Figure 1: Demarcation line fixed at the end of the Korean War 
                                                     
6 Korean War. http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/korean-war.html. Accessed on April 11, 2014. 
7 Why did the Korean War break out in 1950? http://www.johndclare.net/EC5.htm. Accessed on March 08, 2014.    
8 Seidman, B., Korean Reunification. http://www.koreasociety.org/doc_view/888-korean-reunification-by-seidman-brad. Accessed on March 20, 
2014. 
9 Loc cit. 
10 Eschborn, N. and Young-yoon, K., 2013.Korean Reunification Possibility or Pipe Dream? In KAS International Reports. http://www.kas.de/wf/ 
doc/kas_33520-1522-2-30.pdf?130828104557. Accessed on March 03, 2014.  
11 Key Points in Developments in East Asia. Korea as a Colony of Japan (1910-1945). 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm. Accessed on 22 February 2014. 
12 Bell, A., 2012. A collection of Partitions. http://archives.jrn.columbia.edu/2011-2012/www.thepalette.us//a-collection-of-partitions/. Accessed 
on November 23, 2014. 
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The establishment of two separate countries in the Korean Peninsula started the erosion of 
Korean national identity. The countries were founded on two completely opposite political 
ideologies and started to deteriorate the identity of the Korean people through different 
approaches to modernisation.13 They have kept the Korean language intact, but they have 
adopted some different words and grammar. Their respective territories have blocked mutual 
communications and transportation.  
The most serious damage to Korean national identity had been imposed on Korean culture. 
Korean culture developed into two different ways, influenced by Western democratic and 
capitalist culture in the South and totalitarian and communist culture in the North. Some North 
Korean observers think that Western culture has been progressively leaking into the North and 
will ultimately weaken the North Korean political system.14  
2.2. Tracing North Korea's and South Korea's relations during the last four decades 
Despite North Korea and South Korea being politically separate entities, the governments of 
North Korea and South Korea have proclaimed to restore Korea as a single state. On July 4, 
1972, the North Korean and the South Korean governments made a joint announcement that a 
representative of each government had secretly visited the capital city of the other side and that 
both sides had agreed to a "North-South Joint Communiqué", outlining the steps to be taken 
towards achieving a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.15  
In this Joint Statement both Koreas began to discuss their problems of diplomacy and on how to 
improve their relations and unify the divided nation.16 With the common hope of achieving 
peaceful reunification, the two sides exchanged views and came to a mutual understanding 
during these talks.  
The two sides reached the following principles as a basis of reunification: (1) reunification must 
be solved independently without interference of external powers; (2) reunification must be 
                                                     
13 Sang-seek, P., 2014. Korea must work to repair national identity. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140817000325. Accessed on 
September 17, 2014. 
14 Loc cit. 
15 Nixon Shock. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nixon-shock.asp. Accessed on April 11, 2014. 
16 Lee Hu-Rak, 1972. Joint Statement of North and South. http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/coree/A/coree72. Accessed on April 23, 
2014. 
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obtained peacefully without the use of armed forces, and; (3) ethnic unification is required 
transcending differences in ideologies.17  
On August 18, 1976, the Axe murder incident at Panmunjom occurred in the Joint Security 
Area (JSA) located in the Korean DMZ.18 The incident occurred by a pack of axe-wielding North 
Koreans killing two US Army officers for being part of cutting down a tree that limited the 
visibility of the US soldiers working at checkpoint.19 Thereby, the incident intensified inter-
Korean relations and the North failed to keep the promises of joint statement.  
On December 13, 1991, the two Koreas signed a "Basic Agreement" on nonaggression, 
reconciliation and a joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The 
agreement prohibited both sides to produce and test nuclear weapons and prohibited the 
possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.20 On January 30, 1992, 
DPRK signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), but it failed to reach an agreement on the main issue of creating a bilateral 
inspection regime.21 
After the Korean War separated the Korean families, the two Koreas held their first family 
reunions in 1985.22 However, the family reunions were not repeated until June 15, 2000, when 
the two Koreas agreed to have regular reunions during the Sunshine Policy (which was the 
foreign policy of South Korea towards North Korea).23 On December 13, 1991, the two Koreas 
signed a "Basic Agreement" on reconciliation, nonaggression, cooperation, and a joint 
declaration on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.24 The "Basic Agreement" offered 
cultural and sports exchange between the two Koreas and also prohibited both sides to produce 
and test nuclear weapons.25 On March 25, 1991, a unified Korean team used the Korean 
                                                     
17 Lee Hu-Rak.     Op. Cit.     np. 
18 The Axe murder incident. http://www.tourdmz.com/english/04dmz/p1-4.php. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
19 Loc cit. 
20 McKercher, B.J.C., 2011. Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft. 
http://books.google.co.za/books?id=dGypAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA413&lpg=PA413&dq=On+13+December+1991,+the+two+Koreas+signed+a+%E
2%80%9CBasic+Agreement%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=9XXaUuxaF5&sig=igIah--ji3bTdkVFk7_OOWpqEm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=QelIU7 
SnKs-V7AafxoCwDQ&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=On%2013%20December%201991%2C%20the%20two%20Koreas%20signed 
%20a%20%E2%80%9CBasic%20Agreement%E2%80%9D&f=false. Accessed on April 14, 2014. p.413. 
21 Loc cit. 
22 Choe Sang-Hun, 2009. Cries and Hugs at Reunion of Families in North Korea. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/world/asia/27korea.html?_r=0. Accessed on April 23, 2014.  
23 Loc cit. 
24 McKercher, B.J.C.     Op. Cit.     p.413. 
25 Jones, C., 1990. North-South Korea Talks Produce Freer Dialogue, Summit Proposal. http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/0907/ochat.html. 
Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
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Unification Flag at the World Table Tennis Competition in Japan.26 However, on January 30, 
1992, when DPRK signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA it failed to reach 
agreement on the main issue of creating a bilateral inspection regime.27  
On June 15, 1999, the First Battle of Yeonpyeong took place by DPRK naval boats crossing the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow (West) Sea.28 The South Korean navy conducted 
bumping operations to force the ships back across the NLL, sinking one torpedo boat and killing 
number of the North Korean armies.29 Thereafter, on June 13 to 15, 2000, the first Inter-Korean 
Summit was held between the DPRK President Kim Jong-il and the ROK President Kim Dae-
jung, they began to discuss the lack of formal communication between the two Koreas, which 
made it difficult to discuss political and economic issues.30 The Inter-Korean Summit outlined 
the following: the end of the Korean war, the massive operation of troops at the DMZ, and the 
development of nuclear weapons in DPRK. However, on June 29, 2002, the Second Battle of 
Yeonpyeong took place by the North Korean patrol boats intentionally crossing the NLL and 
started fire on a South Korean patrol boat which resulted in the deaths of six South Koreans.31 
A South Korean democratic activist, Kim Dae-jung, became President of South Korea in 1998. 
He instituted Sunshine Policy (1998-2007) to promote reconciliation between North Korea.32 As 
part of this policy, the South Korean government began to improve its economic and trade 
relations with the North through cooperation as the North was recovering from a devastating 
famine. The Sunshine Policy was principled on separating humanitarian assistances and 
economic cooperation's from political issues. Regardless of mutual distrust between North Korea 
and South Korea, building trust gradually through economic means and humanitarian exchanges 
could help them overcome their problems. Soon after the Sunshine Policy, North Korea shattered 
South Korea's hope by testing new ballistic missile in violation of multiple international 
commitments. 
                                                     
26 Jones, C.     Op. Cit.     np. 
27 Loc cit. 
28 Macfie, N., 2010. Factbox: The battles of the Korean West Sea. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-korea-north-clashes-
idUSTRE6AS1AL20101129. Accessed on February 22, 2014. 
29 Loc cit. 
30 Encyclopedia Brittanica Blog. 2006. Reflection on the 2000 and 2007 Inter-Korean Summits. http://www.britannica.com/blogs/reflections-on-
the-2000-and-2007-inter-korean-summits/. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
31 Macfie, N.     Op. Cit.     np. 
32 The National Committee on North Korea. An Overview of Inter-Korean Relations.http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-
papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy. Accessed on February 22, 2014. 
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The Sunshine Policy outlined three basic principles of the South Korean national security: (1) the 
ROK actively wants cooperation, (2) the ROK will not accept armed provocation by the North, 
and (3) the ROK will not absorb the North or undermine its government. As part of this policy, 
the South Korean government began to improve its economic and trade relations with the North 
through cooperation as the North was recovering from a devastating famine.33 Soon after the 
Sunshine Policy, South Korea's hopes of the Sunshine policy was shattered with North Korea 
successfully conducting its first underground nuclear test in Hwaderi near Kilju city on October 
9, 2006.34 Consequently, on October 14, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed 
sanctions against DPRK, limiting arm trade, humanitarian aid as well as obliging an end to its 
ballistic missile tests.35  
The declaration on the advancement of the North-South Korean relations, peace and prosperity 
was signed on October 4, 2007 by Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun.36 In the peace declaration, 
South Korea's bilateral aid and humanitarian assistance to North Korea was increased to show 
goodwill.37 This declaration provides seven agreements between North Korea and South Korea: 
(1) resolving the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the 
Korean people; (2) working for mutual respect and trust in order to overcome the differences in 
ideology and system; (3) reducing military tensions and resolving tensions in the inter-Korean 
economic cooperation; (4) ending the current armistice and establishing permanent peace; (5) 
creating a peace zone in the Yellow Sea; (6) forming of a West Sea Economic Center in the 
North Korean port city of Haeju, and; (7) developing cooperation in the language, education, 
technology and social sectors.38 However, the next President of South Korea Lee Myung-bak, 
did not implement these agreements.39 
The Six-Party Talks (2003-2007) fundamentally aimed to find a peaceful resolution to prevent 
North Korea's nuclear development through negotiations involving the US, Japan, ROK, DPRK, 
                                                     
33 The National Committee on North Korea.     Op. Cit.     np. 
34 Nitikin, M.B., 2009. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues. 
http://books.google.co.za/books?id=oHSi_zusTU4C&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=vicinity+of+P%27 
unggye&source=bl&ots=kIFk9CYTGO&sig=RrCQzNM5kiyu2BYUFERDzdwnM3o&hl=en&sa=X&ei=T2hXU7quBIud7QbQ3ICgBQ&ved=0
CDoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=vicinity%20of%20P'unggye&f=false. Accessed on April 23, 2014. p.10. 
35 Loc cit. 
36 S Korea, DPRK sign joint declaration on peace, prosperity. 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/04/content_6830147.htm. 
Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
37 Aidan Foster-Carter, 2003. Dr. Corn continues to help Korea heal, in International Herald Tribune. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-
71975228.html. Accessed on April 20, 2014. p. 7. 
38 Loc cit. 
39 The National Committee on North Korea.     Op. Cit.     np.  
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USSR, and China.40 In the Six-Party Talks both the Koreas aimed to repair the following issues: 
(1) building security guarantee, (2) normalising diplomatic relations, (3) constructing light water 
reactors of North Korea in return for its closure of nuclear power plant programme at Yongbyon, 
(4) promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), (5) removing economic sanctions of the US towards the North, and 
(6) completely disarmament of North Korea. However, some members of the Six-Party Talks 
have disagreed on the last point.  
The US and Japan wanted North Korea to completely dismantle its nuclear programme, while 
ROK, China and USSR have settled for less severe actions and preferred to exchange fuel aid 
with DPRK's nuclear facilities since they feared the US assaulting on their soil and also a sudden 
collapse of the North Korean regime would generate major refugee influxes in their country.41 
Subsequently North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003.42 The North Korean and the South 
Korean governments have not been involved in high-level political negotiations since the 
armistice negotiations had ended the Korean War.43 
On November 23, 2010, North Korea attacked South Korea's Yeonpyeong island by killing two 
civilians and two armies.44 On February 29, 2012, the US and North Korea announced their "leap 
day" agreement.45 In this bilateral agreement, North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear 
activities and allowed the return of IAEA inspectors to Yeonpyeong, while the US restarting its 
food aid to the North. However on April 6, 2012, North Korea once again failed to implement its 
promise by launching another long range rocket into space.46 Furthermore, during the US and 
ROK training exercises of "Foal Eagle" in 2013, DPRK threatened to discard the 1953 Korean 
Armistice Agreement, arguing that the exercises of the US and ROK threatened DPRK with 
                                                     
40 Jayshree Bajoria, and Beina Xu, 2013. The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-
north-koreas-nuclear-program/ p13593. Accessed on April 11, 2014. 
41 Jayshree Bajoria, and Beina Xu.     Op. Cit.     np. 
42 Loc cit. 
43 Snyder, S., 1999. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. http://www.usip.org/publications/understanding-north-korean-
negotiating-behavior. Accessed April 18, 2014. 
44 Macfie, N.     Op. Cit.     np. 
45 US-DPRK "leap day deal" announced. 2012. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/02/29/us-announces-new-deal-with-dprk/. Accessed on April 
23, 2014. 
46 Loc cit. 
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nuclear weapons and that the US was unwilling to negotiate a peace treaty to replace the 
armistice.47  
Thereafter, on April 9, 2013, DPRK warned ROK with threats of war as a result of its anger of 
joint US-ROK military exercise.48 However, an actual nuclear strike from DPRK had caused 
more disorder in the Korean Peninsula since the US has a joint military exercises involving 
nearly 200,000 troops in the region.49 On April 4, 2014, DPRK rejected ROK's offer on family 
reunions, "followed by the North firing a dozen short-range missiles".50 North Korean war games 
shows that until the US forces are completely and permanently withdrawn from South Korea, it 
will be almost impossible to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. The only way to the peace 
and peaceful reunification of Korea is to implement the idea of the Peace Declaration without 
relying on foreign forces. 
 
Figure 2: The ups and downs of North Korea and South Korea relations towards reunification, 
1972-2014 
                                                     
47 NSNBC. 2014. 2014 US – South Korean Key Resolve and Foal Eagle beyond War "Games". http://nsnbc.me/2014/02/24/2014-us-south-
korean-key-resolve-foal-eagle-beyond-war-games/. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
48 Kim, C., and Lee, J., 2013. North Korea warns foreigners to leave South amid new threats of war. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-korea-north-idUSBRE934080 20130409. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
49 Loc cit. 
50 Kim, S., 2014. North Korea Spurns Talks for More Family Reunions With South. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-06/north-korea-
rejects-talks-for-more-family-reunions-with-south.html. Accessed on April 24, 2014. 
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As indicated in Figure 2 and shown in the timeline of Koreas four decade relations, the Korean 
Peninsula has seen rise of tensions in the wake of the North Korean regime's provocative actions 
as seen in 1976, 1992, 2002, 2004, 2010, and 2014; and also the South Korean regime not 
keeping its promises in 1999 and 2013. North Korea's provocative actions can be linked to the 
continuous joint military exercise of the US and ROK as well as the influence of the external 
powers in the Korean relations. Over the years, North Korea's unpredictable nuclear actions lead 
to economic sanctions from the UNSC which deepened the North's economic crisis and famine.  
As the North Korean economy continued to weaken, the North deteriorated to become a so-
called failed state that could not maintain its military.51 These economic crises did not concern 
the North Korean government to discontinue its nuclear development. According to the Secretary 
General of Korean Association of Social Scientists, Ri Song Chol, "the more US imposes 
sanctions on us the more courageous people we will rise. The US implemented troops on our 
borders and to protect our nation we had to develop our nuclear weapons. Even if the US 
imposes further sanctions on us, we will carry on developing our nuclear weapons thus leading 
our economies behind. For us to develop our economy, the US should lift these sanctions and the 
UN should treat all the countries equally rather than being manipulated by the Western 
powers".52 
The Korean relations had, and continue to have a lot of ups and downs. Most of the Korean 
peace negotiations failed for the following reasons: (1) The North Korean government feels 
threatened by the existence of the US troops in South Korea, simultaneously the South Korean 
government feels threatened by North Korea's nuclear enrichment; (2) North Korea aims to be 
independent without being subject to external imposition of interference which directly weakens 
its alliance with South Korea; (3) the Western powers did not offer North Korea with sufficient 
incentives and failed to implement their promises;53 and lastly (4) North Korea secretly launched 
new ballistic missile technologies and refused to denuclearise after the Six-Party Talks which 
escorted to the failure of the peace talks.  
                                                     
51 Hyeok, J.D., 2013. Unification through Absorprion "Most Likely". https://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1122. 
Accessed on April 24, 2014. 
52 Ri Song Chol, the Secretary General of Korean Association of Social Scientists, interviewed by Betul Onugoren, at Wits University 
Johannesburg, October 21, 2014.  
53 Cortright, D., and Lopez, G., 2005. Bombs, Carrots, and Sticks: The Use of Incentives and Sanctions. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/ 
2005_03/Cortright. Accessed on April 20, 2014. 
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The ambiance between the two Koreas is filled with mutual distrust that was built over the years. 
North Korean nuclear weapons represent a significant issue determining the international 
relations with South Korea as well as with the US. Both the Koreas need to change their 
approach, form reliance by negotiations in order to enable mutual understanding. But the Korean 
reunification process is not dependent on Koreans themselves, it is rather dependent on the big 
powers such as the US and China. Both North Korea and South Korea planned unification by 
diplomatic means without using force, but South Korean joint military exercise with the US and 
North Korean nuclear mission has increased military battle and further complicated a win-win 
situation through negotiation.54 Lack of a common regional institution in North East Asia has 
made the procedure for reunification even more complex. As a result, both the Koreas need to be 
independently capable of building a unified Korea without the interference of external forces in 
their domestic problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
54 Ahmed, H. U., Masud, M. H., Faisal, Morshed, N., 2013. "Reunification in Korean Peninsula," in Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. 
Vol. 4, No. 4. http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/26. Accessed on January 15, 2015. 
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 The Initial Transition: The Need to Define the Parameters 
of Different Views 
This chapter discusses disparities in unification policies of the two different systems, including 
the ideologies and beliefs in Korea. It further looks at North Korea's and South Korea's views on 
reunification, specifically looking at the thoughts of Ri Song Chol, the Secretary General of 
Korean Association of Social Scientists, and the thoughts of Yong Man Jo, the North Korean 
Ambassador in South Africa. Subsequently this chapter gives a survey of the North Korean 
refugees (in 2011) and the South Korean refugees (in 2012) in China on the issue of reunification 
that was carried out on the South Korean public TV network, named Korea Broadcasting System 
(KBS). This review helps us to understand the thoughts of both the Koreans on the issue of 
unification.   
3.1. The disparities in Unification Policies between the two different Korean Systems and 
Ideologies 
The division of Korea augmented the existence of two different ideologies and systems, North 
Korea as a socialist regime and South Korea as a capitalist regime. Under Kim Il-sung, North 
Korea developed the "Juche" ideology also referred to as "Kimilsungism".55 The importance of 
establishing Juche was emphasised in building national defence and self-reliance, and avoiding 
the repetition of foreign domination after the liberation of Korea from Japan.56 According to Ri 
Song Chol, the ideology of Juche has been driven by the forces of colonialism which allowed 
North Korea to be master of their own destiny by maintaining the spirit of self-reliance.57 
Historically North Korea was more developed than the South. North Korea's reluctance to reform 
and pursue the reliance on "socialist trade" was North Korea's first barrier to development. In 
fact, North Korea's production declined after the 1990's (see Figure 3).58 The very remote nature 
of the North Korean people and very highly centralised nature of the government would indicate 
                                                     
55 Chamberlin, P.F.     Op. Cit.     p.19. 
56 Chol, K.M., 2001. Kim Jong Il: Day Of Having Korea Reunified. http://library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/4015.pdf. Accessed on  August 10, 
2014. p.26. 
57 Ri Song Chol.     Op. Cit.     np. 
58 Blum, U., 2011. Can Korea Learn from German Unification? https://ideas.repec.org/p/iwh/dispap/3-11.html. Accessed on August 20, 2014. 
p.7. 
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that the main principles of democracy and a market economy would be unfamiliar and intricate 
for North Koreans to acknowledge.59 This is best shown by the extremely united and open South 
Korean people against an extremely separated and controlled North Korean people.60 Even if a 
peaceful society is formed among the Koreans, bringing about the change to democracy and a 
market economy to the North Korea society would be difficult. 
 
Figure 3: Development of North Korean and South Korean Output 61 
The result of firm devotion to Juche and the military first policy has been reflected in the 
continual state of the North Korean economy. During this time, South Korea emerged a robust 
democracy and became the eleventh largest economy in the world since the beginning of the 21st 
century.62 In other words, this motivational asymmetry can compensate the "inferiority" of North 
Korea by its nuclear power capabilities as a tool of defending itself against the "superiority" of 
South Korea which is supported by the imperialist US.63  
On October 10, 1980, Kim Il-sung announced his last version of "Formula for Creating the 
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo".64 The North Korean government has instructed the 
                                                     
59 Pfennig, W., 2001. Korea and Beyond: National Reunification has International Implications. file:///C:/Users/Ahmet/Downloads/8.1_ 
Pfennig.pdf. Accessed on August 20, 2014. pp. 120‐ 121. 
60 Loc cit.  
61 Values taken from MADDISON, 2007, until 2003 prolongated with growth rates from CIA World Factbooks to 2010. 
62 Chamberlin, P.F.      Op. Cit.      p.20. 
63 George, A.L., 1993. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. http://www.amazon.com/Bridging-Gap-Theory-Practice-
Foreign/dp/1878379224. Accessed on April 20, 2014. p.111.  
64 Kuark, JYT., Economic Impact of Korean Reunification. www.karyiuwong.com/confer/seoul02/papers/kwurk.PDF. Accessed on December 01, 
2014. p.2. 
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following preconditions to create an integration: (1) the US must draw out its armed forces from 
the South; (2) South Korea must remove fascist laws like Anti-Communist and National Security 
Law; (3) the armistice agreement must be changed with peace treaty, and; (4) the current South 
Korean government must be replaced by a democratic people's government.65 Options (2) and 
(3) are seen as reasonable, except (1) and (4) are seen as impossible.  
Under this formula Kim Il-sung suggested that the reunification of Korea can be attained under 
the principles of "interdependence, peace, and national unity," and at the same time both North 
Korea and South Korea preserve their existing political ideologies and systems. Kim Il-sung also 
believed that "Supreme National Confederal Assembly" should be formed with an equal number 
of representatives of both Koreas to act as a confederal government managing the two 
independent states and military forces to follow issues related to national interest.66  
South Korea's unification method is based on understanding the two different political ideologies 
and governing systems of Korea. The South Korean government supports a slow integration 
approach toward unification through a "Korean Commonwealth" as a transitional system.67 With 
this approach, the two sides would enhance their economic cooperation and mutual exchanges in 
order to understand the basis of each other's political ideologies and governing systems. 
Thereafter this would help to rebuild a national community and eventually a unified democratic 
nation via elections. 
The unification policies of North Korea and South Korea differ enormously not just in their 
approach to unification but also in the gradual form of unified state. As previously mentioned, 
the North Korean government wishes the coexistence of two different systems as a confederation 
state. It is obvious that this kind of state of affairs cannot be seen as a legitimate unification and 
it is not accepted by South Korea because the idea of socialist economy has been rejected in 
agreement of the free market economy. Thus, the Juche thought is naturally contradictory in an 
                                                     
65 Kuark, JYT.      Op. Cit.      p.2. 
66 Loc cit. 
67 Loc cit. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
22 
 
inter-reliant global economy. The North Korean government has shown an inconsistency in its 
own unification policy by showing that it is willing to make incomplete revisions.68 
3.2. North Korea's View towards Reunification 
Towards the end of the 1980's, particularly since the wake of the unification of Germany, the 
North Korean view of national unification has been defensive, rather than offensive. This was 
seen in 1991, when Kim Il-sung clarified that he is against the "way of eating and being eaten" 
― specifically, unification by means of absorption ― calling for national unification under the 
so-called Koryo Confederation System.69  
With regards to the Korean unification, North Korea has maintained two unchanging views after 
the division of the peninsula. The first is that the division was the result of external forces or the 
imperialist forces. According to Ri Song Chol, because of the imperialist powers Korea was 
divided into two.70 The second is that the issue of unification is a problem of recognising the 
independence of the nation as a whole.71 As a result, the North Korean government claims that it 
would like to see reunification, on the basis of five conditions: (1) the US must not interfere in 
Koreas internal affairs, (2) the US must provide assurances of nonaggression, (3) South Korea 
must expel anti-unification forces such as the US and Japan, (4) the US must agree not to impede 
the DPRK's economic development, and lastly (5) the "By-Our-Nation-Itself" independence 
model must be recognised without the interference of external forces. The 'nation' that North 
Korea speaks of implies the term used in the "Chosun Nation First Policy", an isolated 'nation' 
imbedded with class connotations.72  
The North Korean leaders' perception of the political situation is based on the fear of having been 
surrounded by imperialists since the Korean War, and the greatest imperialist threat comes from 
the US. In the Cold War era, North Korea stated that "there is no place on the earth that is not 
affected by the evil influence of the US and there is no country that does not feel the threat of 
                                                     
68 National Unification Board, 1989. To build a national community through the Korean commonwealth. http://books.google.co.za/books/about/ 
To_build_a_national_community_through_th.html?id=n6FxAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y. Accessed on December 01, 2014. 
69 The change is reflected in the "Five-point Guidelines for the Reunification of the Fatherland" (May 1990) and the "Ten-point Guiding principle 
for All-Korea Unity" (April 1993). 
70 Ri Song Chol.      Op. Cit.       np. 
71 ICG Asia Report. 2003. North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy: What Does the DPRK Want? 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/061%20North%20Korea%20A%20Phased%20Negotiation%20 
Strategy.pdf. Accessed on April 20, 2014. p.5. 
72 ICG Asia Report.      Op. Cit.      p.5. 
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violence from the US; the US once threatened the North with military assault and is interfering 
with its national reunification".73 In fact, North Korea predicted the collapse of the US empire, 
representing the fall of imperialism as an objective law of historical development. 
North Korea has perceived South Korea from the perspective of its linkage with the US. South 
Korea has been described as "a fascist colonial regime of the imperialist US".74 North Korea's 
unification policy has maintained such perspective throughout the Kim Il-sung regime, Kim 
Jong-il regime, and the present Kim Jong-un regime. On January 1, 2014, Kim Jong-un 
underlined that in order to resolve the problem of unification, "external forces must be 
denounced and the views of our people ourselves must be firmly adhered to".75 From this 
perspective, it can be assessed that North Korea's unification policy has shown consistency since 
the division to this day. 
The North has suggested that South Korea should create a revolutionary democratic base in order 
to turn the entire Korean Peninsula to a communist country, suggesting two different unification 
plans: unification by military force and unification by joining the aid of South Korean anti-
government activists in changing the South. The North has also started to implement double-
edged unification policies; irregular military aggravation, and the pursuance of the "united front" 
strategy toward unification.76 
It is difficult to say that North Korea has totally given up the idea of unifying Korea by force of 
arms. Continual military aggression, the improvement of military forces and Kim Jong-il's 
propaganda calling for change of North Korea into a military giant, all indicate a persistence of 
past hopes.77 Despite the tensions between the two Korea's, North Korea wanted to have 
reunification by all means and their motto is that "division must perish; unification must prosper 
and live in peace".78  
                                                     
73 Park, Young Ho, 2014. South and North Korea's Views on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Relations. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/1/21%20korean%20peninsula%20unification/park%20young%20ho%20paper.pdf. Accessed on 
March 18, 2014. p.6. 
74 Loc cit. 
75 Loc cit. 
76 Loc cit. 
77 Park, Young Ho.      Op. Cit.      p.7.  
78 Yong Man Jo, the North Korean Ambassador in South Africa, interviewed by Betul Onugoren, at Wits University Johannesburg, March 26, 
2014. 
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The main concern of North Korea is the existence of the US troops in South Korea.79 The US 
holds 28,500 troops in South Korea and maintains a heavy naval presence in the Pacific. 
According to Yong Man Jo,  the North Korean Ambassador in South Africa, "as long as the US 
troops remain in Korea the reunification efforts will not succeed".80 The existence of the US in 
the region, lead North Korea to modernise its nuclear weapons. Thus their act is self-defensive 
deterrence to protect themselves from the US forces.81 
The North Korean government believes that their act is just a self-defensive deterrence in order 
to protect themselves against the US forces.82 One advantage of reunification would be enhanced 
regional security through the restoration of peaceful alliances. Currently "the unpredictable 
(conventional and nuclear) threat and aggression potential of North Korea represents the highest 
risk in the area of security policy in Northeast Asia".83 
In 2011, the KBS channel carried out a review between North Korean refugees in China on the 
issue of reunification. The results were as follows:84 
1. Would you like to see a unified Korea? Very much 92% 
Possibly 8% 
Not at all 0% 
2. If you would like to see reunification – what is 
the most important reason? 
"We are one people" 42% 
Better life 45% 
To remove the enmity or tension between 
the two countries 5% 
Possibility of freedom to travel 8% 
                                                     
79 Jayshree Bajoria, and Beina Xu.     Op. Cit.     np. 
80 Yong Man Jo.      Op. Cit.      np. 
81 Loc cit. 
82 Loc cit. 
83 Hefele, P., Barth, B., and Tensi, J., 2012. Military build-up Dynamics and Conflict Management in East and Southeast Asia, in KAS 
International Reports. http://kas.de/wf/en/33.31266. Accessed on June 10, 2014. 
84 Cf. KBS special, "The Grand Plan for Reunification", first broadcast Part 1, 3 Dec 2011; Part 2, December 04, 2011. All translations from the 
Korean by Dr. Young-yoon Kim. 102 people were surveyed. 
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3. In your opinion when do you think reunification 
might be possible? 
Within 10 years 26% 
Within 20 years 6% 
Within 30 years 23% 
Never 45% 
4. Under what kind of political system should 
reunification take place? 
Capitalism 2% 
Socialism 58% 
The "Chinese model" (two systems within 
one country) 40% 
5. How do you view South Korea? As an enemy state 3% 
As our brothers 37% 
As a colony of the USA 60% 
As an independent state 0%      
6. What do you think of the South Korean 
economy? 
It offers the possibility of a much better life 
than in North Korea 80% 
It offers the possibility for many people to 
become rich, but with huge differences 
between rich and poor 16% 
It results in people there being poorer than 
in North Korea 4%  
7. What should South Korea do to bring about 
reunification? 
Achieve independence from U.S. rule 50% 
Give support to the people of North Korea 
28% 
Drop hostile policies towards North Korea 
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22% 
Put pressure on North Korea 0% 
8. Which country do you like the most? USA 4% 
Russia 0% 
South Korea 29% 
China 66% 
Japan 1%  
This short survey shows a good review of North Koreans' thoughts. However, one must take into 
account under what conditions the North Korean people were questioned in China when 
considering the importance of these results. That being said, there are a number of stable North 
Koreans thoughts towards reunification that point to the determination of long-term attitudes and 
opinions gathered from a socialist upbringing. This is particularly clear in the high link of 
positive answers that match to North Korean state policy, and also in the favoured option of 
reunification under a socialist system, the strong dislike of the US and the related poor opinion of 
South Korea.85  
Despite all the criticism, there is also a clear respect for what South Korea's economy has to 
offer, and a clear aspiration for better material conditions in North Korea. As 80 per cent of 
North Koreans believe the quality of life in South Korea to be "much better" than their own. This 
shows that North Koreans are evidently capable of distinguishing their quality of life from others 
regardless of the fact that their country is cut off from the outside world. It also implies that the 
guarantees made by the state's leaders that things will get better are not likely to be believed 
forever. The fairly careful or even pessimistic estimations of when reunification may take place 
imply a high degree of realism. Though, an assessment of these answers must also take into 
account that North Korea itself generates an environment which gives rise to such beliefs. 
 
                                                     
85 Eschborn, N. and Young-yoon, K.     Op. Cit.     p.86. 
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3.3. South Korea's View towards Reunification 
From 1948 to 1960, the South Korean former leader Rhee Syngman aimed to establish a unitary 
state through general elections based on liberal democracy and the market economy, but at the 
same time included unification by 'the use of armed forces' as a possible means.86 Thereafter on 
August 15, 1970 the preceding President Park Jung-hee proposed the "8.15 Declaration" to build 
a foundation for peaceful unification which became the diplomacy guidelines for the South 
Korean government.87 His official unification policy was a three phase unification approach: (1) 
a phase of reconciliation and cooperation, (2) a phase of the Korean Commonwealth, and (3) a 
phase of unified Korea of "one country, two systems". However, this system will only solve the 
external issues of one Korea, not the internal issues of different social systems.88 After 
unification, the political and economic systems of each side will develop in their own ways. 
The newly-elected president Park Geun-hye on February 25, 2013, daughter of the former 
president Park Chung-hee, believes the lack of basic trust in Korean relations is the main reason 
for the current problems between North Korea and South Korea.89 Park believes that the "Trust-
building Process" on the Korean Peninsula could build a basis for national unification.  
During Park's visit to Dresden (former East Germany) from March 25 to 28, 2014, she came up 
with the "Dresden Doctrine".90 In her doctrine, Park stressed upon three key areas, namely: 
"humanity, co-prosperity and integration".91 Park believes that Germany defeated the after-
shocks of unification quite rapidly and attained the level of integration of today because of the 
continued people-to-people interaction that took place before unification.92 
Drawing similarities to inter-German cooperation and contact earlier to unification in 1991, 
Park's roadmap to unification is initially to reunite the separated families, restore a sense of 
common nationhood, broaden humanitarian aid, and as trust builds between the two states then 
                                                     
86 Park, Young Ho.      Op. Cit.      p.3. 
87 Ibid. p.6. 
88 Zhao, Q. and Sutter, R., 1991. Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam― Unification, Conflict Resolution, and 
Political Development. http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=mscas. Accessed on December 09, 
2014. p.51. 
89 McCurry, J. 2013. Park Geun-hye takes office as South Korean president. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/25/park-geun-hye-
korean-president. Accessed on October 5, 2014. 
90 Kim, E., 2014. President Park Geun-hye's Dresden Declaration. http://cogitasia.com/president-park-geun-hyes-dresden-declaration/. Accessed 
on August 10, 2014. 
91 Chang Jae-soon, 2014. Park uses European trip for drive to leave legacy on N.Korea. Accessed on October 5, 2014. 
92 Loc cit. 
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they will start economic programmes and invest in social infrastructural projects in 
telecommunication and transportation in North Korea.93  
Park also stated that "Working together from sowing to harvesting will enable South and North 
Korea not just to share the fruits of our labour, but also our hearts. As the bonds of trust begin to 
burgeon between the two sides, we can start to look at larger forms of development 
cooperation".94 I agree with Park when she said, "What we need is not one-off or promotional 
events, but the kind of interaction and cooperation that enables ordinary South Koreans and 
North Koreans to recover a sense of common identity as they help each other out".95 As a result, 
recovering their common identity by working on their mutual interest and security, will lead to a 
successful reunification.  
Unlike other policies, Park is willing to enlarge cultural and humanitarian exchange with the 
North without preconditions particularly on its nuclear, which should serve as the source for 
enduring alliance. However, Park also believes improving peace and security on the Korean 
region automatically means finding a solution to the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons. 
There are three main strands to Park's position: the South Korea's North Korea policy must be 
further developed, both North Korea and South Korea must be prepared to change, and South 
Korea's North Korean policy should not be overhauled every time there is a change of 
government.96 Although, in January 2013, the first doubts started rising in the media as to 
whether South Korea's North Korean policy during Park's time in office would really be able to 
effect change. Added to this is the worry that "trustpolitik" could once again be dictated by those 
who favour use of the military force over dialogue when it comes to the concept of "defence 
versus dialogue".97 
                                                     
93 Kim Tae-gyu. 2014. Park's 'Dresden Doctrine' faces tough test?. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/09/180_154914.html. 
Accessed on October 6, 2014. 
94 Loc cit. 
95 Chang Jae-soon.     Op. Cit.     np. 
96 Eschborn, N. and Young-yoon, K.     Op. Cit.     p.96. 
97 Ibid. p.97. 
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The KBS channel carried out another survey in August 2012, on the issue of reunification 
between South Koreans. The results of this second survey were as follows:98 
1. How interested are you in the reunification of 
Korea? 
 
Extremely 24.6% 
Very much 49.2% 
Not very 22.8% 
Not at all 3.4% 
2. What is your attitude towards reunification? 
 
It should definitely happen 25.4% 
It is desirable as long as it doesn't put too 
big a burden on South Korea 43% 
Both Korean states should co-exist on the 
basis of mutual cooperation 24.6% 
It should definitely not happen 7%  
3. What would be your biggest concern in the 
event that reunification takes place? 
Massive financial burden on the people of 
South Korea  54.1% 
Social unrest, unemployment, crime 18.5% 
Political and military conflict 15.3% 
Mass migration from North Korea to South 
Korea 11.1% 
International diplomatic difficulties 1% 
4. What is the most important goal of 
reunification? 
Economic cooperation, cultural exchange, 
reuniting of families, and travel 
                                                     
98 Cf. 24th research edition of the KBS programme on reunification, "Examination of people's attitudes to the reunification of Korea 2012", first 
broadcast, October 15, 2012. 1,027 people were surveyed. 
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opportunities 68.9% 
Strengthening South Korea's economic 
power 12% 
Building trust between the two countries' 
militaries 11.6% 
A summit meeting of the two countries' 
leaders 5.8% 
Dismantling of national security legislation 
1.7% 
5. Which other country could be useful in helping 
to bring about reunification? 
None 51.7% 
China 21.6% 
USA 19.5% 
Japan 2.6% 
Russia 2.1% 
Other countries 2.5% 
6. How willing are you to bear the costs of 
reunification? 
Not willing at all 39.6% 
Less than 1% of my annual income 41.4% 
1-5% of my annual income 15.7% 
5-10% of my annual income 2.6% 
More than 10% of my annual income 0.6%    
7. When do you think reunification might be 
possible? 
Within 10 years 17.1% 
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Within 11-20 years 35.7% 
Within 21-30 years 21.2% 
After more than 30 years 14.8% 
Never 11.2% 
This survey shows that the overall view of South Koreans and the majority of interviewed people 
believe that this historic progress could still happen within their life. Financial concerns seems to 
be a general concern when it comes to South Koreans' feelings towards reunification and 
overshadow even the fear of social tensions if the two Korean nations reunite. Unpredictably 
China is seen as a possibly more cooperative ally than the US when it comes to reunifying 
Korea, even if only by a small margin.99   
All main studies point that those who accept the main liability for forming reunification – recent 
South Korean generation in the age of 30's – are generally uncertain or even refuse the 
reunification since they do not feel it has any significance to their own lives and future views.100  
In 2012, the current conservative government recognised the reality of this problem and 
illustrated it with an unusual degree of transparency: "Unfortunately, today we are at a point in 
time when younger South Koreans enjoy a greater degree of prosperity than any other generation 
of South Koreans lived before them. The prosperity has made them become complacent while 
being less conscious of the need for national unification. In the meantime, those who have 
focused on the cost Germany had to pay for its unification became hesitant to support Korean 
unification".101 This statement indicates that the current government has done little awareness to 
increase the South Korean public's consciousness of the advantages of reunification.  
                                                     
99 Yong-Sup Han. Going Into The "Unification Tunnel": Strategic And Military Implications. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
conf_proceedings/CF152/CF152.chap3.pdf. Accessed on August 10, 2014. p.90. 
100 Yu Woo-ik, 2012. Keynote address, conference Unification and the Korean Economy. 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache: 
USaqaK25dtUJ:www.unikorea.go.kr/cwsboard/board.do%3Fmode%3Ddownload%26bid%3D1034%26cid%3D19944%26filename%3D19944_2
01405142044516910.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za. Accessed on August 10, 2014. 
101 Yu Woo-ik.     Op. Cit.     np. 
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Observers note that there has been lack of knowledge and education in schools and universities 
on the factual Korean history. This results today's younger generation in the South to slowly 
move away from the common idea of reunification.  
3.4. China's View on the Korean Reunification 
From all the powers in Asia, China is the main status quo power in the region. The Korean 
Peninsula is at the heart of Northeast Asia and its' strategically and geographically import 
because of its trade route for cross-border investment. Thus, it is in both China and the US 
interest to stabilise the Korean region and to sustain both Chinese and American prosperity, as 
conflict or intense security competition would limit economic development and reduce cross-
border investment and trade.  
When Chinese leaders look at the situation in North Korea they are reminded of their own 
experience, when they were economically and politically isolated from the international 
community decades ago.102 Historically, China has always sustained its relations with Korea and 
hopes that united Korea will keep its economic and diplomatic relations with China even after 
reunification. China is anxious about possible threats and its status quo in the region after 
reunification of Korea. The prospect of a reunified Korea with a possible nuclear capability, and 
hegemonic US presence in Korea would cause great worry to the political and military leadership 
of Beijing.103  
According to the survey above, 21.6% of the South Koreans believe that China will be useful in 
helping to bring about reunification in Korea. Although, China has always maintained the belief 
of Korean reunification by peaceful means, it has been interpreted that in fact China has no real 
interest in Korean reunification. Instead, China wants to keep North Korea as a de facto buffer 
state between itself and the US troops in the South, and also to avoid influx of refugees into its 
own borders in the event of sudden unification.104 However, if the Korean Peninsula is unified by 
                                                     
102Kulacki, G., 2013. U.S. and China See North Korean Problem Differently. http://allthingsnuclear.org/u-s-and-china-see-north-korean-problem-
differently/. Accessed on  January 14, 2015.  
103 Stahl, A.C., 2001. Operational Planning Issues for the Peaceful Reunification of the Korean Peninsula. http://www.ntis.gov/search/product. 
aspx?ABBR=ADA400766. Accessed on April 14, 2014. p.26. 
104 Eschborn, N. and Young-yoon, K.     Op. Cit.     p.100. 
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Seoul, China will try its level best to create a good relationship with South Korea and reduce the 
US influence in the peninsula.105 
The role of China in the Korean unification process sort of prolongs it since Beijing has 
increased their energy and food aid in recent years. China's increasing interest in Korea is caused 
by at least three reasons: (1) China wants to secure its interest and security in the region by 
stabilising its relations with the North and its neighbouring states, (2) China is challenged by the 
possibility that the US may continue to implement forces on the region after unification, and (3) 
China fears that South Korea and the US could implement unilateral actions to oppose instability 
in the North that could weaken China's long-term hegemonic political, economic and security 
interests.106  
Economically, China would benefit a great deal from having a leadership role in the core of the 
world's fastest growing economic region. And regardless of the initial costs of reunification, 
Chinese analysts expect that a unified Korea would increasingly become a regional economic 
powerhouse.107 China clearly tries to maintain a considerable ability to shape its long lasting 
regional outcome. But such prospects underline the further need for much closer talks between 
China, South Korea, and the US.108  
3.5. The US's Hegemonic Goals in Asia 
The US has two planned goals in its relations with South Korea. The first goal is to protect its 
territories from the Chinese and the Soviet threat, to secure economic success by limiting 
communist worldwide growth, to preserve democratic principles and values in the free world, 
and to create a world order suitable to the US.109 Although the US-South Korea alliance has 
changed eventually,110 the main component of their relations for the US carried on to contain 
                                                     
105 Lankov, A., 2014. China Does Not Want the Korean Peninsula to be Unified. http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/parallelt-
thoughts/divided-02242014161914.html. Accessed on 0ctober 10, 2014. 
106 Pollack, J.D. and Lee, C.M., 1999. Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
monograph.../MR1040.pdf. Accessed on December 12, 2014. p.18. 
107 Wang, Fei-Ling, 1999. "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on Korean Reunification," in Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 167, No. 185. http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/2290138/joining-major-powers-status-quo-chinas-views-policy-korean-
reunification. Accessed on August 10, 2014.  
108 Pollack, J.D. and Lee, C.M.     Op. Cit.     p.19. 
109 Young-Koo Cha, "US-ROK Security Relations: A Korean Perspective", in Robert A. Scalapino & Han Sung-joo eds., Untied States-Korea 
Relations (University of California Press, 1986), www.inss.re.kr/inss/attach/getFile.do?fileId=3928. Accessed on January 11, 2015. p. 136. 
110 South Korea and the US are important economic partners. Almost 60 billion dollars of trade volume between the two states show their 
economic interdependence. However the export volumes to the US has declined 20 percent in 2002 while the share of export to Chinese market 
has increased, which led Beijing to become number one export destination for Seoul. 
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China and the USSR.111 Therefore, Seoul has been a major security provider to the US in 
Northeast Asia, in exchange for the US to protect South Korea against the North Korean 
military.  
The second goal is to protect South Korea against the North Korean threat. With the stability 
given by the US defence commitment, South Korea democratised and deterred an invasion from 
North Korea. For this reason, South Korea increased its reliability of alliance with the US, and 
the US's role and commitment in military support in an event of war.112 Additionally, South 
Korea believes that the US existence is needed for preserving balance of power in Northeast 
Asia, as the previous South Korean ambassador to the US, Hong Hoo-hyun, said: "The South 
Korean president added it would be better for the US forces to be kept in South Korea to prevent 
Japan and China from engaging in efforts to gain hegemony in the region".113 As a result, both 
South Korea and the US share a hegemonic goal in their relationship: the deterrence of North 
Korea for South Korea's security.  
The US security plan in the East Asian region has the following four aims: (1) encouraging 
human rights and democracy; (2) preventing violence and endorsing peaceful resolution of 
conflicts; (3) improving economic incorporation and regulations based on trade, and; (4) 
supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons objectives and access to the security of sea lines 
of communication in cooperation with its associates. According to the National Security Strategy 
in 2000, the US "seeks a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a democratic, non-
nuclear, reunified peninsula that will enhance peace and security in the East Asian region".114 
The US firmly relies on partners in the region who all share similar objectives that would permit 
regional stability. "The greatest and most fundamental future challenge to the US in the Asia-
Pacific region may simply be to maintain a presence".115 Although, "One of the principal US 
                                                     
111 Jung-Ik Kim, 1996. The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship. http://www.amazon.com/Future-Us-Republic-Military-
Relationship-Jung-Ik/dp/B001UP9X2K. Accessed on January 11, 2015. p.109. 
112 Loc cit. 
113 Carpenter, T.G., and Bandow, D., 2004. The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea. 
https://books.google.co.za/books?isbn=1403965455. Accessed on January 5, 2015. p. 133. 
114 Kang, W. I., 2007. The Media-government Relations: Comparative Analysis of the United States, South Korea and North Korea's media 
coverage of foreign policy. https://books.google.co.za/books?id=pIvgQsMjqFkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed on 
January 13, 2014. p.103. 
115 Haselden, C. E., 2002. The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army. 
mil/pubs/parameters/articles/02winter/haselden.pdf. Accessed on January 15, 2015. p.120. 
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concerns is that the perceived regional stability would lead to a call for the withdrawal of US 
forces based in Northeast Asia".116 
Due to the rising possibility of insecurity and all of the main powers interests in the peninsula, it 
is important that some type of communication and intention is in position before crisis explodes 
on the region. Without such means of communication, there is incentive for unilateral action on 
all sides with unchanging outcomes.117  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
116 Ibid. p.122. 
117 Stahl, A.C.     Op. Cit.      p.40. 
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 Seeds of Hope: Lessons from Reunification Experiences of 
Germany, Vietnam and Yemen 
As Korea remains divided to this day, this chapter attempts to find an ideal political and 
economic process as well as conditions that will allow Korea to achieve successful reunification. 
In order to do so, this chapter carries out case studies on reunification experiences of the three 
reunited countries, namely; Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen.  
This section will bring together a collection of formerly divided nations ― Germany, Vietnam 
and Yemen. There is a large variety of differences between the three countries in terms of their 
geographical locations, historical backgrounds, and the international roles that they have played. 
However they all have shared at least one common characteristic, these formerly divided 
countries have similar political, social, and economic ideological differences and are products of 
the Cold War. Thus, they all have to answer a sequence of questions with regard to the current 
Korean disagreement. 
In general, the scenarios of unification for the Korean Peninsula can be divided into three types: 
(1) unification by absorption, which East German and West Germany achieved successfully on 
January 18, 1871; (2) unification by force, which North Vietnam and South Vietnam achieved 
successfully on July 2, 1976, and; (3) unification by consensus, which North Yemen and South 
Yemen achieved successfully on May 22, 1990.118  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
118 Jong-Yun Bae, 2010. "South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea: The Evolution of the Engagement Policy and Its Impact upon 
U.S.-ROK Relations," in Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2. California: University of California Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010. 
50.2. 335. 2014. Accessed on March 20, 2014. p.344. 
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4.1. The Case of Germany 
 
Figure 4: Map of Germany after its Division 119 
The division of Germany was a product of a collision of ideologies and a struggle over power 
between the US and the USSR. After World War II, the US and the USSR could not reach an 
agreement on how to manage the post war situation, which then escalated in the so-called Cold 
War era.120 Thereafter Berlin wall was built in 1961 and secured the border between the West 
and the East of Germany (see Figure 4). Germans were not allowed to go to either side freely 
until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.121  
There were two ways of unifying the German economy. One was to slowly unify the economy 
and the other was to quickly expand Western policy in East Germany. Germany decided to use 
                                                     
119 Sylblum. 2013. Wings of Desire/Der Himmel über Berlin (Wim Wenders, 1987). http://sylblum.wordpress.com/2013/10/19/wings-of-
desireder-himmel-uber-berlin-wim-wenders-1987/. Accessed on November 26, 2014. 
120 Loc cit. 
121 Seidman, B.     Op. Cit.     np. 
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the rapid economic unification method which increased unemployment and the collapse of the 
previous East German economy. However prior to the unification, East Germany and West 
Germany had a lot of problems such as differences in currency levels, in housing and food 
products, in property rights, in development level of agriculture and industries, and so on.122 As a 
result, when the financial support was removed, East Germans tackled economic difficulties with 
high costs.  
The strong West German economy played an important role in rebuilding the new German 
society and in financially assisting the repatriation of USSR troops.123 The Federal Republic of 
Germany addressed this issue by presenting a document named "Joint Measures to stimulate the 
economy" on March 03, 1991 to endorse higher profits and social security system in order to 
proceed the national wellbeing and prevent social conflicts.124 Germany invested 12 billion in the 
same year to produce employment and sponsor investments. With this system, Germany was 
able to create 11,000 jobs in the early 1990s.125 
The process of German reunification progressed much more quickly than it had been imagined. 
The breakdown of the communist government and the USSR control in East Germany made the 
reunification even more possible. The reunification was still peaceful due to the majority of the 
economic and political problems that were solved prior to the declaration of the united Germany 
and the outcomes of the post-reunification process, regardless of several economic crises in 
Germany.  
The experience of German unification process is a good example for Korea. Korea should bear in 
mind that if reunification does take place it will not be an easy process. The process of German 
unification has been very costly in terms of employment, manufacturing output and rebuilding 
the former East German economy.126 Nevertheless any major structural change is a costly 
process. There are five reasons that made the economy worst in the case of Germany because of 
the policies that were used during the process of unification, which Korea could learn from.  
                                                     
122 A Joo Kim, 2010. Analysis on the Reunification Experiences of Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen. http://www.sbc.edu/sites/default/files/ 
Honors/AJooKim.July31_0.pdf. Accessed on March 20, 2014. p.18. 
123 Ibid. p.54. 
124 Ibid. p.23. 
125 Loc cit. 
126 Lee, C.H., 2004. Reunification of the Two Koreas: An Economic Agenda. www2.hawaii.edu/~lchung/Korea%20Reunification.pdf. Accessed 
on May 20, 2014. p.268. 
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The first includes Korea should form a democratic political system in at least one side of the 
divided nation. In this case, South Korean politics should be peacefully settled so that North 
Koreans have a "South Korean dream" and come together to fight for their freedom from 
Communism and dictatorship in North Korea. Secondly South Korea should continue to develop 
its economy and show strong leadership since reunification will cost a huge amount of money. 
South Koreans will then need to be financially secured in order to build infrastructural projects 
and other developmental projects in North Korea.127  
The third lesson is that Korea must actively prepare flexible and peaceful reunification strategies 
that correspond to the changes in the international political sphere. Fourthly Korea should 
maintain good relationships with neighbouring countries and participate in international 
organisations and meetings. In order to do so, Korea will need to cooperate with each country 
and build trust with them by peaceful means, and; lastly Korea will need to be able to resolve 
any concerns from neighbouring countries regarding Korean unification. Like Germany, Korea 
will need to secure peace in the Korean Peninsula, follow the regulations and objectives of the 
United Nations (UN) when unification takes place, remove its bad human rights record, and stop 
its nukes by easing the tension in Northeast Asia.128  
After reunification, Germany faced economic downfall for some time, however they eventually 
achieved economic growth and mended the aftermath of the reunification peacefully without any 
violence among themselves. Bearing this in mind, a comparison between both Koreas per capita 
income illustrates that South Korea's income is at least 16 times higher than the North. This 
difference is much more than that in the start of a reunited Germany.129  
The Korean reunifications financial impact shows much more than that of German reunification, 
because of the bigger gap in productivity among the two Koreas and North Korea's much bigger 
populace of the unified Koreans.130131 The predictable big economic load on South Korea is 
attributable to the fast increase in social spending for North Korean occupants, rather than to the 
                                                     
127 Lee, C.H.     Op. Cit.     p.26. 
128 Ibid. p.27. 
129 Andrei Lankov, 2012. Continuity and Change in North Korea. http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/Publications2013/Meredith%20paper%20 
(edited%20version%202).pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2014. p.2. 
130 Auerbach, A. J., Chun, Y. J.,  and Yoo, I., 2004. The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunification: A Generational Accounting Approach. 
eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/burden2.pdf. Accessed on August 19, 2014. p.2.  
131 See future recommendation: point number 29, page 70. 
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direct restoration cost of the North Korean economic structure after the breakdown of its 
previous economic system.132  
Reunifying radically two different Korean economies will be a costly process that will require all 
Koreans, specifically South Koreans, to make sacrifices. South Korea's social aims must revolve 
around promoting understanding and acceptance. The social obstacles may be the hardest to 
overcome depending on how the South Korean citizens treat the North Korean refugees. 
Economically, South Korea should focus on breaking the overpowering dominance of business 
monopolies and on cheering the development of new business plans.133 Seoul must productively 
organise the economy of reunified Korea to ease the harsh economic differences. With a more 
steady economy, South Korea will be able to monetarily endure the arrival of a new work force 
including the unskilled North Korean refugees.  
Economic cooperation between the two Koreas could help North Korea to alleviate its economic 
burden and to increase its productivity.134 North Korean infrastructure is in need of major 
advancement since the regime's focus is on military means and a major lack of investment in 
public infrastructure. A programme of rebuilding North Korea's infrastructure would create large 
investment and employment opportunities to put in the overall cost of reunification.135 The South 
Korean government is well aware of the seriousness of economic development to shape a market 
economy and social security policies. Recently, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea 
receives a lot of investment by companies in the South which also allows employment 
opportunities for the North Korean population.136 This sort of collaboration offers a helpful 
model for reunification efforts.  
The German experience has shown that fiscal management and policy effort would be needed to 
overcome the problems of infrastructural development and income inequities, over a long period 
of time.137 While the South Korean government seems willing to fund the reunification effort and 
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papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy. Accessed on August 16, 2014. pp. 57‐58. 
137 Hart-Landsberg, M., Korean Unification: learning from the German experience. http://www.learningace.com/doc/1055618/631d13a5e2 
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has thought of starting a mechanism to fund reunification, a plan to take on support from the 
international society and associated institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
would need management and growth as a priority.138 
If the German-like unification comes true, the unified Korean government will then provide the 
North Koreans with significant help to guarantee their basic standard of living. Under a complete 
unification, the labour markets and the basic needs of North Koreans will be met, but incomes of 
South Korean companies would rise, leading to lower profits for companies doing business in the 
North. Consequently, this will slow down the industrial growth and the speed of job creation in 
North Korea. For this reason, high unemployment rate was one of the biggest problems in East 
Germany after reunification; this would be sterner in the case of North Korea. Moreover, a huge 
amount of government support could also weaken the poor's willpower and entrepreneurship to 
advance their lives independently. The poor could then rely only on the government without 
even attempting to look for a job.139 
It goes without saying that to achieve the most peaceful Korean reunification, rearranging the 
institutional structures and sustaining South Korea's domestic life must become the most 
important priority. As South Korea is the country that is most like to be absorbing the other, 
South Korea must be prepared to get the impact of the fall when the North Korean government 
collapses.140 Whilst operating such duty is not an easy task, if the Korean people can stick to the 
fundamental economic, political and social aims, then attaining positive domestic situations for 
reunification is surely foreseeable.  
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4.2. The Case of Vietnam 
 
Figure 5: Map of Vietnam after the 17th Parallel Division 141 
In 1954, Geneva agreement in Sweden signed by Viet Minh and the Indochina French colonial 
government agreed on dividing Vietnam into two by the 17th Parallel (see Figure 5).142 The 
North Vietnam became Vietnamese Democratic Republic under Ho Chi Minh setting up 
Communist forces (anti-Western), and the South Vietnam became Republic of Vietnam under 
Ngo Dinh Diem setting up anti-communist forces (pro-Western).143 In 1976, the North Vietnam 
                                                     
141 Defeat of Saigon. http://liviacapnotebook.wikispaces.com/Unit+VIII. Accessed on November 26, 2014. 
142 Spector, R.H., 2014. Vietnam War. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/628478/Vietnam-War. Accessed on October 09, 2014.   
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took over the South Vietnam by force and merged to form the modern-day Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. 
During the Vietnam War a great number of the US inhabitants opposed the US involvement in 
South Vietnam. Some activists within the peace movement supported a unilateral removal of US 
forces from Vietnam. Opposition to the Vietnam War gathered groups that opposed the 
imperialist US. Anti-war protests ended with the last removal of troops after the Paris Peace 
Accords  were signed in 1973.144 South Vietnam was left to defend itself independently on 
December 13, 1974, when North Vietnamese forces attacked Phuoc Binh region in the South.145  
At the beginning of 1975, the South Vietnam had thrice as many weaponry of the North 
Vietnam. But because of the rising oil prices the South could not use much of its weaponry. 
While North Vietnam was well-determined and funded by the communist bloc, the South faced 
increasing chaos since their economy was too dependent on the US financial support and the 
presence of a large number of US troops in the South. On April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese 
troops entered the city of Saigon.146  
After briefly examining the case of Vietnam, to avoid issues such as economic chaos and war in 
Korea, both North Korea and South Korea need to avoid the influence of external forces. If 
Korea relies too much on the foreign influences, then the cost of unification will be too severe 
and destructive. Korea should focus more on increasing agricultural production and resolving 
food shortages by dismantling communal farms and implementing the family farming system in 
North Korea. Korea should also reduce poverty and profit gap between the Koreans by 
equalising between rural and urban areas and should continue to expand into other industries, 
such as trade, construction, and manufacturing, to create new businesses and business 
opportunities.147  
The conventional understanding about the economic improvement in Vietnam is that the open 
door policies were the most successful outcomes for economic expansion. Open door policies 
consist of creating foreign direct investment (FDI), starting special economic zones (SEZs), and 
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encouraging exports.148 It is apparent that these policies were essentially good by carrying 
positive outcomes. However, domestic change and development is a requirement for thriving 
open-door policies. Consecutively for North Korea to develop, it should first reform the overall 
domestic structure.   
Domestic reform policies in Vietnam brought great result in a short period of time, at the same 
time it took longer period of time for the open door policies to attain thriving outcomes. Both 
previously separated countries set up SEZs, but they were unsuccessful to draw foreign 
companies' awareness at first with little influence on the economy as a whole. Only once they 
opened more provinces, stated their purpose to draw more foreign companies, and more notably, 
encouraged outsiders that their reform and open door policy would not vary, foreign direct 
investment came in deep. It took about 10 years after they affirmed opportunity and 
transformation. 
If the Vietnamese-style unification is implemented in the North to slowly develop their economic 
growth, the deprived North Koreans could then use entrepreneurship more practically.149 I think 
reform and entrepreneurship by North Koreans themselves would be a much better option to 
form a better society, than development driven by South Koreans and foreign entrepreneurs.  
If open policies are made only for foreign companies, the impact would be limited. Foreign 
companies invest in low-income country like Vietnam because they want to exploit low-wage 
workers and bring most of their materials, equipment, and parts from their home country to 
produce them for export purposes. In this 'processing trade' model, wages are the only income of 
the countries who received FDI. South Korean companies are currently doing business in the 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex in the same way; as a result the income of North Koreans is not as 
big.150 Thus North Koreans should form a network with national allies and do overseas trade 
with them to achieve major gains in their economy. This way North Korea could have open-door 
policies with advanced market economies such as South Korea, China, and Japan, to see faster 
results than Vietnam.151  
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What we should bear in mind is that an economy cannot be developed by a handful of foreign 
technocrats. Countries and international organisations who wish to help North Korea from the 
outside should primarily support the internal reform efforts by North Koreans themselves. A 
large-scale aid in the start is likely to weaken their independent efforts for reform. Foreign aid 
should take a secondary position of sustaining the achievement of internal reforms. In addition, 
foreign aid should also focus on transfer of knowledge and technologies, rather than material and 
financial support. This will promote North Koreans to make intended efforts for economic 
change and development.152  
4.3. The Case of Yemen 
 
Figure 6: Map of Yemen after its Division 153 
The division of North Yemen and South Yemen started from a treaty between the British and 
Ottoman empires in 1904. North Yemen became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
and the British left the area around the port of Aden that became South Yemen in 1967 (see 
Figure 6).154 North Yemen became a theocratic monarchy, governed by the Imam Yahya of 
Zaydis Shiite community, while South Yemen was governed by a socialist regime and adopted a 
Marxist orientation which led to a great migration of people from South Yemen to North 
Yemen.155  
                                                     
152 Suk-Jin Kim.     Op. Cit.     p.260. 
153 Yemeni Unification. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_unification. Accessed on November 26, 2014. 
154 One World Nations Online, History of Yemen. 2012. http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/Yemen-history.htm. Accessed on March 
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Yemen's unification process was greatly influenced by the discovery of oil in the North in 1984 
and by internal separations that damaged the South in 1986.156 Yemen's oil deposits near the 
North-South border were reserved by the rules of the region, but they offered incentives for the 
South to help in joint examination.157 The power-sharing principle throughout the transitional 
period of two and half years that aimed to stabilise political power between North and South 
until the country's first democratic elections, which did not work out seeing that the country 
faced a Civil War in 1994.158  
After the reunification Yemen experienced a civil war in 1994 and more protests in the South, 
known as the "Southern Movement".159 While the circumstances under which the reunification 
was attained and the outcomes were less than ideal, Yemen still accomplished its reunification 
by giving each state equal authority through 50-50 power sharing method and remains a united 
country to this day.160 Despite these internal conflicts, Yemen eventually achieved reunification 
without one side actually splitting from another.  
Yemen's way of consensual unification shows that the two states attained an incomplete 
agreement without resolving their main differences prior to unification. The result of this 
scenario, lead to a collapse by North Yemen occupying South Yemen by force in 1994. When 
considering the significant differences between the two Koreas, including political systems, 
economic capabilities, and social structures, consensus might be more difficult than absorption.  
Bearing in mind the contradictions between consensus and absorption, it is important for Korea 
to understand what could happen at each stage of the process ahead. This may begin with 
awareness of the current understandings that prevail in South Korea. Absorption looks at a short 
timetable and usually does not think of the outcomes after unification, whereas consensus looks 
at a moderately longer timetable and thinks of the outcomes after unification.161 However if 
consensus is unrealistic and absorption seems foreseeable, the North would have no reason to 
join in consensual unification with the South. Such doubts imply the existence of many serious 
                                                     
156 History of Yemen. http://www.yemenweb.com/History.htm. Accessed on August 9, 2014. 
157 Day, S., 2010. The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_south_movement.pdf. Accessed on August 9, 2014. p. 4. 
158 A Joo Kim.     Op. Cit.      p.53. 
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160 A Joo Kim.     Op. Cit.      p.47 
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questions that leave people wondering whether unification through consensus on the Korean 
Peninsula is really possible.162  
Given that South Korea offered peaceful coexistence with North Korea in its unification plan, the 
view of absorbing the North has become more underlined. After all, the South conceives a 
unified Korea as a state with a democratic political system and a capitalist economic system.163 
This means that even if unification occurs by consensus, the South would still unify Korea by 
absorbing the North. With this in mind, the North has criticised the core of the South's policy, 
stating that unification by consensus is no more than an illusion for absorbing the North. 
According to Pyongyang, Seoul's "destructive" logic would make capitalist values and liberal 
democratic values penetrate the North's society, disordering social unity and generating regime 
collapse. 
However, just like Germany, it is very important for Korea to construct good economic and 
political collaboration with external powers. With regards Yemen, the Arab states often 
intervened in the conflicts between North Yemen and South Yemen and gave financial help 
when needed. They even believed Yemen unity as Arab unity. In the case of Korea, the external 
powers would be the US, Japan, China, and the USSR. Although neither of these states 
enthusiastically encourages Korea's reunification, there are numerous economic and political 
collaboration attempts among Korea and these states.  
Both Koreas need to identify the other side as an independent country and gradually build trust 
among each other. Regardless of both the Koreas membership in the UN, North Korea and South 
Korea does not identify each other's autonomy but instead antagonism exists among them. Then 
the two states should continue social and economic cooperation and more frequently grasp 
reunification negotiations in diplomatic and non-violent way. And finally, the agreements should 
be attained not only among the governments, but also among the citizens. The number of 
                                                     
162 Jong-Yun Bae.     Op. Cit.      p.348. 
163 See the speeches of Chun Doo-whan on January 22, 1982; Roh Tae-woo on September 11, 1989; and Kim Young Sam on September 15, 
1994; and the inaugurals of Kim Dae-jung on February 25, 1998, and Roh Moo-hyun on February 25, 2003. Refer to the National Security 
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Security Council, 2004), pp. 20–21. 
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reunification processes Korea goes through does not matter if the citizens themselves do not wish 
to reunite; it would be difficult to form a sense of united society between the public.164 
The analysis on the above mentioned reunified countries shows that some political, economic, 
and social factors play a vital role in laying down an ideal process towards successful Korean 
reunification. Improving peace and security on the Korean Peninsula automatically means 
finding a solution to the crisis of North Korea's nuclear weapons, if only because a united, but 
nuclear Korea "is the last thing regional powers want to see on the Korean Peninsula".165 A 
unified Korea would have a major effect on the existing balance of power in the region and 
South Koreans believe that the six-party talks can tackle the allegations of such reunification.  
In the long term unified Korea can generate a multilateral security planning for the East Asian 
region as a whole. Any development in this way would have to consist of the replacement of the 
existing Korean War ceasefire agreement with some sort of peace agreement. Although this too 
will only be possible with the help of the US, Japan, China, and the USSR that have major 
interests related with the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea are well aware of this fact. For 
Seoul "it is of paramount importance, inter alia, to develop the Korea-China strategic cooperation 
in harmony with the Korea-US alliance"166 – something that will need a real balancing act to be 
accepted by the two rival major powers.167 However, one may conclude that a peaceful 
international environment is important for the resolution of rising conflicts like those starting out 
of national divisions that were initially caused by the external powers. 
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Korean Reunification: Four Possible Scenarios 
  
After studying and examining the reunification processes of Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen, this 
chapter provides four possible scenarios for the Korean reunification. These scenarios could 
unfold depending on the context in which some economic, political, and military events happen. 
Hence, unification could happen with few early signs, or it could be delayed for years or even 
decades. 
Despite the risks and costs of reunification, the scenarios of how reunification is likely to be 
achieved need examination as to which scenario will be the best option for Korea. How Korea 
should prepare itself for reunification depends on how reunification will be brought about. There 
are at least four possible scenarios that could be used in the reunification of Korean and these are 
as follows: (1) unification by step-by-step (process of reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence); (2) unification by absorption (process of the South taking control over the North 
after the collapse of the Northern regime); (3) unification by conflict (invasion of the land by 
either North Korea or South Korea), and; (4) unification by external intervention (China 
interfering in North Korea's regime before South Korea's interference).  
5.1. Scenario One: Step-by-step Unification by Reconciliation, Cooperation and Peaceful 
Coexistence 
The most peaceful method of uniting Korea would be through step-by-step process and gradual 
integration. This process is a "multistage process in which economic and political union will be 
gradually achieved through negotiations [reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful coexistence] 
between North and South Korea".168 Such a process would mainly focus on encouraging cultural 
exchanges and slow integration among the two nations. In other words, major socio-cultural 
                                                     
168 Kim Hak-Joon, 1993. Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective, in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-
Korean Relations, James Cotton, ed., Canberra: Australian National University Press. file:///C:/Users/Ahmet/Downloads/Prospects_Korean_ 
Reunification.pdf. Accessed on April 15, 2014. p. 48. 
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barriers would have to be conquered before such a process could even be considered, and a wish 
to form "one national homogenous population" would have to be encouraged.169 
The step-by-step process needs some time before the actual reunification can occur. It needs 
active collaboration between both countries and a long-term planning to gradually restore the 
national common identity by recreating the economic, political, cultural, and social boundaries 
that segregate the two people. There are three steps to step-by-step unification: the first step is 
reconciliation, the second step is cooperation, and the last step is peaceful coexistence. 
The first step in this scenario is seen as the most optimistic scenario, but it would be extremely 
difficult to achieve. To achieve peaceful integration, the inter-Korean development would entail 
steps such as: an initial acceptance of the status quo by the two Koreas and by four major 
powers, the US, Japan, China and Russia.170 This step would form a long sought national 
integration, and can be seen as a two plus two model since a mutual recognition is essential. 
The second step would involve a formal peace treaty. A period of peaceful coexistence and 
understanding before these steps are taken into action. The incorporation of Koreas would 
involve levelling of each other's economic, political and social policies.171 In such case, the most 
difficult part would follow, not only for the governments' administrators but also for the two 
societies: structural change growing along the lines of a "one nation, two systems" approach 
evident in previous South Korea's proposals for unification.172 
This step could be achieved through economic interdependence between North Korea and South 
Korea. The greater the economic ties between the two powers, the more both sides will have a 
strong interest in avoiding conflict, keeping peace and facilitating good relations. By increasing 
trade and tying North Korea's economy tightly to South Korea and the rest of the world, North 
Korea could hesitate to initiate war for fear of economic repercussions. The economic 
interdependence between North Korea and South Korea already serves to create a strong mutual 
interest in maintaining peace and with the exception of a major disruption relations between the 
                                                     
169 Kim, S.     Op. Cit.     np. 
170 Stankiewicz, W. 2012. "Interdisciplinary Political And Cultural Journal," in International Studies. Vol. 14, No. 1. http://dspace.uni.lodz.pl: 
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two will probably draw them closer together, constraining any tendencies towards conflict (see 
Figure 7). 
The third step would be that any reunification must be peaceful and non-threatening. This means 
that the military aspects of the reunification process must be addressed as well as the economic 
and social elements. Through reconciliation and cooperation, the inter-Korean military relations 
will be marked, which will allow personnel exchanges, confidence building and greater 
transparency between the Koreans.173 However, if unification is achieved by the following stages 
of reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful coexistence, a number of unexpected concerns that 
may arise will be less than the case of a sudden collapse of the North, since this step will allow 
the armed forces of the Koreas to slowly get used to each other.174 Thus, "backward mapping" 
should be used to identify what North Korea and South Korea should do in military affairs under 
phased unification.175  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Integration and Negotiation176  
Once reunification is rational, the newly formed country can be controlled in one of the 
following two ways:  
Firstly, this unification process can take place by South Korea applying a level of reform to 
allow North Korea accept Chinese style free market laws in an attempt to apprehend its 
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constricting economy.177 Simultaneously, "no attempt should be made to democratise the North 
Korean government. In fact [...] a Chinese model of economic development requires an 
authoritarian central government to impose economic reforms from above".178 Such reforms 
need to be aligned by a gradual enlargement in economic cooperation between Pyongyang and 
Seoul, "while military confidence-building measures would be put in place to reduce both the 
cost and size of respective force structures. These measures may then allow the relationship to 
progress through a commonwealth-type arrangement that would eventually lead to complete 
federation".179 However, before North Korean and South Korean economies can unify 
peacefully, North Korea should widen its transition to a free-market-oriented economy. 
Secondly, the joint national government would be ruled by the South due to its larger population 
and stronger state potentials. Successfully seizing the North Korean nation under this rule, South 
Korea would implement democracy and most probably discard the North Korean system and 
ideology of Juche.180  
In order for this scenario to unfold, both North Korea and South Korea will have to start 
reflective alterations in their approaches and suppositions about each other and temporary steps 
should be introduced to allow bigger changes.181 The 1953 Armistice Agreement should be 
replaced and a permanent peace treaty must be signed.182 At the same time, the future of the UN 
Command, the Combined Forces Command, and the subordinate command roles and future 
missions must be examined and reformed. The changed strategic conditions of a reunified Korea 
would mean that the US forces would have to withdraw their troops from the Korean Peninsula 
and a new security mechanism would be positioned to match the development of a consolidated 
Korean defence force.  
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Peaceful unification can be achieved by the cessation of armed aggressions, military threat, and 
ideological oppositions, eventually allowing the creation of a unified Korean state. But first, 
North Korea and South Korea need to accept each other as full negotiating partners and as equal 
legal entities before starting a chain of compromises that would lead to a mutually required 
political settlement. Then both sides must mutually agree to the settlement, during and after 
unification process, in order to form a functioning, unified state. 
5.2. Scenario Two: Unification through Collapse and Absorption 
Since the late 1980s, when the official unification formula of the South Korean government was 
introduced as a response to the initiatives that marked the end of the Cold War, as North Korea's 
economy fell into deep crisis and widespread famine, it emerged that the South had a good 
chance to absorb the North but instead the Kim Young-sam regime chose consensus over 
absorption and helped the North to sustain its regime.183  
There are two different arguments to unification through absorption by South Korea. First is that 
the North Korean regime is too easy to collapse and second is that the North Korean regime has 
the ability to overcome absorption by the South.  
The following six points indicate why the North Korean regime collapse would be an easy 
process. (1) North Korea will collapse because of quick reform since a considerable amount of 
foreign assistance will only be given dependent on North Korea's systemic change; (2) The Kim 
Jong-un leadership has no ability to turn its economy around;184 (3) The worse the economic 
problems become, the more traitors and breakages within the leadership will happen; (4) The 
authority of the Kim Jong-un regime will be at risk once the citizens realise the insolvency and 
insincerity of the ideology of the Juche; (5) As the citizens struggle increase, a military coup or 
other kind of upheaval from the top will occur, and; (6) Change in the economic and political 
systems will precipitate the end of the state eventually.185 
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Conversely, some Chinese and North Korean leaders and experts strongly believe in the power 
of the North Korean regime, and they provide four points in their counterarguments against those 
who believe that the North Korean regime can easily collapse. These are as follows: 
(1) The North Korean radical domestic control over the inflow of external information can detect 
any type of instant grassroots resistance movement; (2) North Korean scholars believe that the 
North Korean political regime is quite stable in comparison to the South Korean political regime; 
(3) The military is extensively integrated around the Kim Jong-un regime that it is almost 
impossible for any military coup to take place; (4) The North Korean regime has a strong faith in 
overcoming the South in a war, and; (5) The North Korean people are used to severe famine, and 
are tremendously compliant to their leadership. Thus, the North Korean regime has achieved 
their goal in controlling its citizens without any obvious battle.186 
Weighing out these two counterarguments, if the North Korean regime cannot preserve 
successful economic, political, social and military control. This eventually would lead to the end 
of the state. Unification through collapse could occur in three different ways: (1) a collapse 
where political insecurity is out of control and where the descendant regime is incapable to start 
or preserve successful governing power led either by the military, the party, or the bureaucracy; 
(2) a collapse that results in closure of the ruling power, which a descendant regime managing to 
maintain political and military control, and; (3) a collapse that could begin by some type of 
internal conflict or triggering event, in the shape of partial military clashes with the current 
leading powers or externally in terms of border clashes with the South or wider military acts 
directed in opposition to South Korea.187  
If any of these triggers occur, then international forces including the US may intervene to restore 
order. After Korea benefitting from the support of the external forces, negative sentiments are 
possible to arise towards the existence of the US troops in the region. That said; the conditions 
under which North Korea could collapse are difficult to predict. However, unification by 
collapse and absorption could be a possibility if the South refuses to supply food to the North, 
increasing economic crisis in the North, a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime could be 
possible. Although, this scenario could have economic disadvantages for South Korean citizens 
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since there are huge disparities in their economic capabilities, political systems and social 
structures; but with collaboration and understanding of South Koreans, economic difficulty could 
eventually be defeated.  
Within North Korea's devotion to Juche and military would mean that Pyongyang would be 
incapable of making changes for its survival. As a result of the worsening economy and 
increasing humanitarian crisis, economic breakdown would lead to political instability and then 
to state collapse.188 While the North Korean regime has revealed an extraordinary ability to 
endure the severe economic difficulties, this ability has relied heavily on external financial 
support from China and the USSR. But if North Korea experiences more economic set-backs, 
and if it cannot obtain external financial support to sustain its military establishment, the 
following situation might differ from that of the past (see Figure 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Collapse and Absorption189 
Depending on the nature of regime collapse in North Korea, numerous transformations could 
happen. The regime might be unable to support its military and maintain order and control 
throughout North Korea.190 Divisions may appear within the party leadership, and Kim Jong-un's 
rule may come to an end. However, the important issues are not whether the future government 
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will be led by the military, the party, or an alliance including leaders from the party and the 
military. The main issue is whether the successor government will be able to (1) keep authority 
and faithfulness throughout the system, (2) declare successful domestic control, (3) endorse 
economic reforms, and (4) preserve control over main military benefits. 
Moreover, if communication between the military establishments of the North and the South had 
previously take place, such communication could have been expanded into some form of 
cooperation between the respective militaries. With enough financial encouragements, this in 
turn might lead to some sort of denuclearisation of the North, and to set the North Korean and 
South Korean systems. Instead, the resulting circumstances may lead to the rise of regional 
warlords and conflict between them ― these circumstances might then relate to the third 
scenario of unification through conflict. 
5.3. Scenario Three: Unification by Conflict and Occupation 
Unification by conflict is what all military planners and leaders of South Korea dread. The most 
severe threat in this scenario would be the option of North Korea using its Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) capabilities. This scenario could theoretically be a repeat of the North 
invasion of the South in 1950.191 Although this time the US and ROK forces are prepared to 
absorb a North Korean attack and then start on a combined counterattack.  
This scenario might occur from any sudden incident, either by the North invading the South or 
by the South using preventive strike towards the North (see Figure 9). For instance, there could 
be a North Korean invasion of the South based on a provocation from the South or the US; or by 
"preventive" intervention into the North from the South to prevent threatening events in the 
North.192 In any of these conditions, both the US and China would cooperate ― either tacitly or 
overtly ― to end the conflict by using their own military forces to restore and preserve order and 
particularly to prevent further escalation.193 It is also likely that if the conflict progresses, it 
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would result in a large damage imposed on South Korea's capital stock, which would raise 
renewal costs in the South and possibly also the direct capital costs of unification in the North.194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Disequilibrium and Conflict195 
Currently, the North Korean regime has four objectives: (1) preserve the military capabilities and 
maintain strategic momentum so that advance operations can be successful before the arrival of 
US reinforcements; (2) use massive firepower against ROK-US Combined Forces Command 
(CFC) through its weaponry, multiple rocket launchers, and surface to surface missiles; (3) 
isolate ROK and arrest all air and naval facilities capable of maintaining US support, and; (4) 
widespread internal confusion in the population of the South, thereby forming domestic 
pressures in the South for a settlement on terms beneficial to the North.196  
If the last scenario takes place, in which North Korea chooses war against the South but 
eventually loses to the South Korean and the US mutual forces, military integration could be 
achieved with the least possible for future conflict between the given three scenarios. However, 
this does not mean that unification under this scenario is desirable. Previous South Korean 
President Park Chung-hee did not believe that war was the answer and instead believed in the 
uses of unification projects and diplomatic means.197 If war were to break out, the economic, 
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political, social and cultural damage caused by war would be so destructive that unification by 
war should be the least likely scenario.198  
North Koreans are adjusted to severe famine and are extremely obedient to their regimes. But, 
(a) their leadership has no ability to turn its economy around;199 (b) the legality of the Kim Jong-
il leadership will be in jeopardy due to extensive and strong struggle once the general population 
identifies the economic failure and duplicity of the Juche ideology; (c) the worse the economic 
problems become, the more traitors and cracks within the leadership will happen; (d) North 
Korea will collapse as a result of fast reform as a large amount of foreign aid will only be given 
dependent on North Korea's systemic change; (e) once North Korean's struggle is put in order, a 
military coup or other type of revolution from the top will take place, and; (f) change in the 
economic and political systems will eventually end the state.200  
5.4. Scenario Four: Unification by External Intervention 
Considering that a regime collapse could happen in the case of North Korea and a proceeding 
regime comes into power but is incapable to deal with the economic issues, how would the US 
and South Korea deal with weakened yet lasting North Korean regime? As well as assuming that 
China could extend its military and political support to North Korea, what policy objectives 
would then the US and South Korea implement? 
From China's view, if the North Korean regime collapses, it would weaken China's long-term 
security and political interests. Bearing these possible outcomes in mind, Chinese intervention in 
North Korea similar to the Korean War could be a possibility, given: (1) the previous task of 
DPRK as a buffer zone for Beijing and the possibility for massive refugee flows into north-
eastern China; (2) the possibility that the US might carry on positioning forces on the region after 
unification; (3) the economic and political outcomes of a unified Korea directed by the ROK 
under the imperialist US, and; (4) the consequences of a strong US-Japan security association to 
a stronger US-ROK relations in the aftermath unification phase.201  
                                                     
198 Yong-Sup Han.     Op. Cit.     p.61. 
199 Kyung Won Kim, 1996. "No Way Out: North Korea's Impending Collapse," in Harvard International Review, Vol. 18, No. 2. Accessed on 
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Under these conditions, Beijing may choose to position security forces across the border to avoid 
the burst of North Korean citizens. If DPRK remains economically unsteady, China will try and 
fix the situation in North Korea by sending energy and food supplies in order to control any 
immigrants into Beijing. Although, if North Korea becomes too dependent on China and its 
affecting their economy, China might then decide that a collapse followed by absorption by 
South Korea is a more favourable choice. 
Nevertheless, if Beijing chooses a direct intervention, it would make sure that any US forces and 
advantages will not be sustained in the region. On the other hand, Beijing could also aim to 
persuade ROK to sign a peace and alliance treaty in return for its implicit support for unification 
under the support of South Korea, while trying to limit the possibility of future US-ROK security 
alliance (see Figure 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Disequilibrium and Intervention202 
In context of regional and global politics, this reunification process is very challenging and 
difficult. If one state collapses slowly and other state practices its power on the falling state, it 
will produce a universal predicament. If any of the states show a start to a war against another, it 
will automatically become regional or international nuclear war, it will also create worldwide 
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problem. Everyone has something to lose if the two states reunify in anytime through war. So, to 
avoid the upcoming crisis the world community should carry on helping to support the voice of 
mass people of Korea.  
Regardless of which scenario derives a unified peninsula, the economic impact on South Korea 
will directly influence, and most probably deduct from the South Korean standard of living. 
Issues based on security and economy will be the two most urgent problems that Korea will have 
to deal with after reunification. How South Korea responds to these challenges will set lasting 
course to the Korean strategic landscape. 
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A Difficult Path: Challenges for a Reunified Korea 
This chapter examines the challenges likely to be faced by a reunified Korean Peninsula. It 
provides future prospects of reunified Korea which allows us to question whether a post-
reunification process will be successful considering the quality of life between the two countries. 
This chapter further looks at the two aspects of post-reunification: the issues of security and the 
economic costs and prospects of the Korean reunification. Furthermore, it allows us to question 
whether or not a unified Korea would survive in the world economically. However, it does not 
speculate on how such reunification might eventuate, other than noting that the discussed 
scenarios range from military conflict to peaceful reintegration. Despite the conditions that drive 
reunification, it makes the point that each scenario would bring different challenges, costs and 
starting points. 
6.1. Post-unification Dynamics 
The Korean reunification has been the topic of important discussion and thought. In spite of the 
conditions that make reunification, there would be noteworthy problems that would need to be 
prevailed to ensure success. 
Establishing a stable economic environment after unification will be slow and difficult, given the 
significant differences between the two economies, although these differences could narrow in a 
well organised step-by-step unification policy. In the beginning, North Koreans may be less 
materialistic than South Koreans, but as they see major quality of life differences in comparison 
to South Koreans, they will demand for improvements. As a result the South Korean government 
should sponsor investment in the north to avoid major refugee influxes to the South.203  
Unification may damage South Korea's economic growth in the near-term, but the basics of 
Korea's economy should provide a base for development, assuming the society carefully 
continues to implement market economy principles and practices. Unified Korea should quickly 
move to expand trade with China and other countries on the Eurasian land mass. The aim of 
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unified Korea should be to expand its markets and reduce extreme dependence on any trading 
partner.204  
Following political unification, Korea's major task should be to help North Koreans adopt to a 
completely new society and rebuild unified Korea's social institutions.205 Building unified 
Korean society will involve numerous changes to shape new family, educational, religious, 
political, and economic institutions in the face of major cultural differences. This procedure will 
be demanding for all Koreans and particularly for North Koreans, as unified Korea is more likely 
to include democratic South Korean values.  
Even as some North Korean values may continue, South Korean values are likely to take over 
because of demographics and demonstrated success. The level of tension and social disorder will 
possibly depend on the speed of unification. The collision may be moderately small, if the two 
societies mature together gradually rather than merge more rapidly.206  
The North Korean economic improvements may increase mass politics that will place great 
demands on the North Korean government and may abrupt reunification much more quickly. 
Major tasks facing the new unified Korean society will be to improve the quality of life for 
Koreans, create the government's authority throughout the Korean Peninsula, foreign economic 
and security policies suitable to the body politic, and develop common social values throughout 
the unified society.  
Important cultural disparities between the Koreans most important social institutions will 
drastically influence domestic and foreign policy formulation by the new unified Korean 
government and may prove intricate for Koreans to overcome rapidly. Success will mostly 
depend on South Koreans understanding these disparities and developing policies not only to 
manage them but also to implant common values about families, education, religion, government 
and economics.207 
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6.2. Problem of Security 
Security and economic related issues will be the two main concerns that Korea will have to deal 
with after reunification. How South Korea responds to these challenges will place the long-term 
course for not only Korea but also for the whole peninsula.208 In common terms, South Korea 
will be faced with three post-reunification security options: neutrality, autonomy, or alliance.209  
An enduringly neutral Korea, in which Seoul joins itself to neutral actions at all times, is 
recommended by some as a solution to a post-unified Korea's security needs.210 Although, this 
approach has a variety of weaknesses and is more suitable to small states and, as such, is 
unsuitable to the post-reunification environment since Korea's middle power status and the 
related interests of the great powers in the region.211 In various ways, a neutral Korea could 
weaken regional security as "any move made by a neutral Korea could be perceived as favouring 
one or more of the great powers".212 
Autonomy gives rather more realistic choice than neutrality. In a unified Korea, where 
justification for the maintenance of US troops on its land would be no longer permissible, South 
Korea may seek to understand the long kept desire for independence. Within this option, Korea 
could follow some sort of dual equivocation approach where it helps to preserve evenly good 
affairs with China and the US, and in doing so, play each against the other.213 The risk to this 
option is that it may stimulate a repulsive type of Korean nationalism, particularly if Seoul is 
equipped with ex-North Korean ballistic missile or even nuclear abilities that could pose a threat 
and weaken regional security within them. 
                                                     
208 Scott Snyder observes that, despite the fundamental importance of such challenges, "Given the stakes involved, many Korean analysts appear 
to be in denial regarding the prospective Sino-U.S. confrontation, and the ROK government ‘has taken no concrete steps in planning on these 
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org/publications/element.aspx?id=293. Accessed on May 05, 2014. pp. 70. 
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210 In Kwan Hwang goes one step further than most commentators and suggests that a prereunification declaration of neutrality by Seoul would 
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Paradigm for Korean Reunification," in Asian Affairs: An American Review. http://cfile237.uf.daum.net/attach/253ED533534B6F46185963. 
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Alliance is the most likely security option for a unified Korea. To a large extent, which alliance 
option Korea chooses will depend on which scenario ultimately brings reunification and the role 
of the US and China in that process. If Korea decides to ally with the US, the root of the alliance 
will have to transform to fit the new post-reunification environment.214 If that happens, the basics 
of the strategic land in the region will stay unchanged. On the other hand, if Korea leans to 
China, the basics will permanently change. One reason to complicate this strategic plan will be 
the abilities of the unified Korean military. From nearly each view, "a unified Korea with a 
declared nuclear capability would lead to a serious deterioration in regional stability, greatly 
fuelling latent strategic rivalries".215 
6.3. Economic Costs and Prospects of the Korean Reunification 
Over the last seven decades, North Korea and South Korea have been going down very different 
routes. These differences are one of the reasons why the South Korean community doubts the 
reunification of the two different nations. Although, there is also public debate about the fact that 
reunification is becoming an inescapable historical challenge for Korea. As South Korean 
Finance Minister Bahk Jaewan said in 2012 that "we must remember that our fear may come 
from our ignorance".216 By this statement he means that the extensive ignorance within Korean 
society of the political reasons and financial costs of unification. 
The prior President Lee Myung-bak said that "Unification costs would be substantially big, but 
certainly smaller than the tremendous amount of the cost we have to pay to maintain peace and 
stability under the divided nation. We have also clarified that unification costs are a one-time 
payment, while the benefits of the unification will be generated over a long period of time into 
the future".217  
Considering the significant disparities between North Korea and South Korea in terms of per 
capita income, standard of living, growth and size of citizens, it is rational to think that South 
Korea would have to pay the costs of reunification and that these costs would be drastically 
                                                     
214 Coghlan, D.     Op. Cit.     np. 
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higher than was the case in Germany. For this reason, a study of the economic benefits of 
reunification becomes more important when trying to evaluate the trade-offs and revisits of such 
an investment. 
The interest for Korean reunification fuelled by what emerged to be a quick and efficient 
German reunification, have been considerably diminished by the awareness of the high costs of 
reunification. Although comparisons with the German experience were clear, in observation the 
two states have far less in common than first thought.218 Despite these differences, international 
experts have criticised the insufficient and lack of economic modelling approved out by South 
Korean think tanks and economists.219 They argue that a few lessons from the German 
experience, particularly regarding property rights, monetary union, and privatisation of 
industries, will be applicable to the Korean condition.  
Estimates of the cost of Korean reunification vary widely, usually lying in the range between 500 
to 3,200 billion US dollars, or an annual spending of between 7 and 12 per cent of South Korea's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for a period of anywhere between ten and forty years.220 Some of 
these approximations were attained by just doubling the known costs of Germany's reunification, 
based on the supposition that Korea's reunification would be twice as expensive since North 
Korea's economic potential is much lower than that of the Global Depositary Receipt (GDR).221  
Nevertheless, in the early stages of reunification, South Korea will be incapable to take up the 
economic cost itself and will need the support of the international financial organisations such as 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, even if the two-thirds of the costs were 
reduced by transfer payments from Seoul to Pyongyang.222 
As a result, within four decades the GDP of a unified Korea could surpass those of Germany, 
France and probably even Japan.223 But unlike "instant German-style unification", this could be 
achieved on by a gradual integration of North Korea and South Korea. While the North Korean 
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planned economy may be declining, it has unused potential in the form of valuable raw materials 
together with vast potential for growth in productivity.  
North Korea's human resource potential also guarantees its GDP, since North Korea's population 
is growing twice as quickly as that of the South and that its working population will grow at a 
rate of 1.4 per cent per annum over a period of ten years, while South Korea's will actually begin 
to reduce in size after 2013.224 The military could also give a major increase to the workforce, as 
it currently represents around 16 per cent of the country's males between the ages of 15 and 
64.225 
With the move in the international economy towards East Asia, this mixture of capital, raw 
materials and human resources may well turn a unified Korea into a major driver of growth in 
the peninsula and simultaneously further increase its geopolitical importance. For instance, the 
overland transport of goods between Eurasia and the Asia Pacific region could become faster and 
safer. The development of North Korea's domestic economy could also act as an inducement to 
neighbouring countries such as China and Russia to incorporate their underdeveloped regions 
around the borders with North Korea and operate a useful cross-border structural policy.226 
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 Future Recommendations: Alliance, Integration and 
Cohesion 
After examining the history behind the Korean relations and the influence of the big powers in 
the peninsula, this chapter provides recommendations on how to improve the Korean relations 
and to achieve successful reunification in the near future. These prospects for the future can help 
both the Koreas to make the right decision and come to terms by going back to their origins and 
finding a common identity.   
1. Both North Koreans and South Koreans should build a new form of security in the 
Peninsula by addressing mutual vulnerability concerns; 
2. Both countries should overcome their mutual distrust and the potential for conflict; 
3. South Korea should get external help to provide North Korea with food and financial aid 
to lessen famine. Economic growth and management would be necessary to overcome the 
substantial economic injustices between North Korea and South Korea. The 
establishment of North Korea and South Korea economic collaboration can improve the 
quality of Korean lives and guarantee the development of an independent national 
economy. Careful planning and consideration of the main challenges by the Koreans 
would raise the possibility of success; 
4. South Korean firms should start manufacturing or service facilities in the North to 
employ North Koreans and improve their working skill abilities; 
5. South Korea should considerably increase the quantity of funds that are collected to 
prepare for a probable unification; 
6. North Korean economy should be restored by harnessing the international capital market 
since it will be less of a burden on Korean taxpayers;227 
7. Policymakers should think about how to use North Korea's natural resources and attract 
private foreign direct investment from South Korea, Japan, the US and other countries to 
                                                     
227 Eberstadt, N., 1997. Hastening Korean Reunification: The Writing on the 38th Parallel. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52866/nicholas-eberstadt/ 
hastening-korean-reunification-the-writing-on-the-38th-parallel. Accessed on October 10, 2014. 
7 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
68 
 
promote economic growth and investment in the North. The growth of productivity in 
North Korea should speed to ease its economic burdens;228 
8. Foreign direct investment should support business activities in the northern provinces, 
including infrastructure projects, specifically with respect to energy generation and 
distribution, telecommunications, food production, railroads and highways;   
9. The suspended transport and communication between North Korea and South Korea 
should reopen by pledging free use of transport and communication means throughout the 
entire country; 
10. Unity should be achieved on the rule of endorsing co-existence, co-prosperity and 
common interests; 
11. Understanding, trust and unity should be formed among the Koreans by exchange, 
interaction and cooperation; 
12. The fear of invasion by either North Korea or South Korea should be dismissed; 
13. Both Koreas should value democratic system and form groups en route to national 
reunification without refusing one another due to different systems and ideologies;  
14. South Korea should teach the North Korean workers and managers about how a market 
economy works, highlighting specific job-related issues;229  
15. Steps should be taken to tackle the economic disparities between the Koreas in order to 
prevent a group migration of workers from the poor North to the economic opportunities 
of the South; 
16. Despite all the ideological and other differences of the political systems, national unity 
should be formed by forming more family reunions and easier access to either side since 
transportation is a key factor in pre and post-unification; 
17. Unification should be implemented in a peaceful manner by reconciliation and 
cooperation, without the use of any arms; 
18. Combined national army and military defence force capabilities in unified Korea should 
be kept only to deal with external threats and regional security issues; 
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19. Unified Korea should join western economic system, start economic coastal zones, 
change foreign trade system, encourage foreign investment and joint ventures, and 
develop tourist industries; 
20. Unified Korea should develop new understandings of itself as an independent nation-
state, without optioning dysfunctional nationalism;230 
21. South Korea should remove the US troops from the region, yet still keep its economic ties 
with the US to fulfil their economic relations; 
22. North Korea should change the concept of Juche to fit the needs of unified nation, if 
completely removing the highly nationalistic concept proves to be too contentious 
regardless of its clear contradictions with globalisation. If so, the new society and 
generation could replace the Juche term with another;231 
23. The cultural differences should be dealt by the South Korean government starting 
educational programmes based on economy and politics for the North Korean refugees to 
change their actual circumstances found in North Korea, given the opacity of the 
regime;232  
24. Unified Korea should use South Korea's liberal educational system to educate individuals 
who can improve Korea's ability to thrive in the global economy and overcome the 
pressure of unification;  
25. Unified Korea should take urgent measures to stabilise the socialist economic concepts, 
as well as apply economic principles of the free market trade to promote long term 
economic growth and become part of Eurasian market with Pusan, Paris, Moscow and 
Beijing;233  
26. Unified Korea should be pluralistic in terms of religion, although in DPRK Confucianism 
has been mixed with socialist values, which in fact formed the cult of Kim Il-sung. While 
in the ROK Christianity gained a lot of popularity, the government would probably 
outlaw Kimilsungism religious practices and would encourage some Christian 
missionaries and others promoting commonly accepted religions;234  
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27. Unified Korea should develop friendly relations with all countries of the world by 
practicing a peaceful foreign policy; 
28. A reunified Korea could take better advantage of its central geographical location as an 
intermediary base for trade by being the entry point from the Pacific Ocean to China and 
a connecting point between Japan and the mainland of Asia.235 In particular, entrée to 
seaports in the North (near the border between Russia and China) offer vital location for 
transporting goods more efficiently. This would increase Korea's role in international 
trade and bring more business opportunities for Korea by creating new jobs and trade 
relations with other countries, and;  
29. In order for a country to be independent by its domestic market, its economic scale must 
be supported by 100 million people.236 According to the World Bank in 2014, South 
Korea's population is 50.22 million and North Korea's population is 24.9 million.237 
Reunification would thus increase the size of the Korean population and generate a larger 
pool of cheap labour that promotes foreign investment and domestic market expansion. 
Given these recommendations, a range of prospects, challenges, and opportunities is presented to 
stakeholders and leaders in the Korean Peninsula in order to implement these resolutions in 
North Korea and South Korea cooperation to achieve successful reunification.  
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 Conclusion: Underlying Assumptions and Step-by-step 
Unification 
This chapter provides final remarks tying up all the arguments made throughout the paper. It 
shows that reunified Korea would face significant challenges however, with time and support 
from the international community, it would ultimately be successful. Although on the one hand 
unification would cause a fiscal burden on South Korea, but on the other hand with proper 
planning and international support, the Korean unification would be a great success. Thereby, my 
conclusion agrees with the latter, that slow economic advancement of North Korea prior to 
unification would lead to a stable, unified Korea over the following years. 
For many years, North Korea and South Korea have been struggling for political legitimacy. 
North Korea has tried to authorise itself by the Juche ideology and trying to implement it to the 
South by advocating unification prior to peace.238 South Korea has been trying to keep 
cooperation with North Korea so that peace can be pledged before unification and achieved 
through mutual agreement. In other words, the North still refuses to accept the South as a legal 
state while the South is ready to recognise the North as a partner for a joint North-South 
Commonwealth.239  
The very nature of the North Korean political system and ideological differences is a distinctive 
aspect of the Korean relations. The Korean relations are always in between negotiation and 
disagreement. Disagreement in the future seems expected only if the two different systems 
struggle to find security and legality.240 Resuming dialogues and negotiations between the two 
countries is an important factor to build mutual peace and trust. Once North Korea and South 
Korea decide to reconcile their differences through negotiation, it will be easy for them to reach 
agreement on issues such as economic cooperation, nuclear weapon, arms control, cross-
recognition, and reunification on the root of common interests. However, if both the Koreas do 
not solve their problems of differences in their systems and ideologies, unification will not be 
achieved peacefully.  
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Korea's position is now different from the beginning of the 20th century.241 Especially South 
Koreans, who have the ability to decide their own future since they have developed their country 
into one of the world's leading economies. Although the passion for Korean reunification that 
was apparent during the 1990s has weakened mainly because of the resilience of the Seoul 
regime's fear of the enormous cost of reunification and the impact that it will have on South 
Korea.  
Both Koreas need to understand that division greatly increases their status of dependency in the 
region. If the great powers such as the US, Japan, China and Russia try to influence what 
happens on the Korean Peninsula in their own interests, Korea will continue to be a fault line in 
Northeast Asia and will bring further instability to the region.242 As such how the big powers in 
the region plan and react to reunification will set the future strategic landscape in Northeast Asia. 
In order to attain peace and stability not only in the peninsula but also in the region, Korea 
should be unified in a way that primarily reflects the wishes and interests of the Korean people of 
both sides, and not those of the bigger conflicting powers. 
Even though Korea went through a lot of meetings, conferences, and agreements in attempt to 
reunite, and still did not thrive in their attempt. However, looking at the reunification experiences 
of Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen, Korea can set a perfect process toward unity and an ideal 
economic, political, and social conditions suitable for both the Koreas. These conditions can be 
found by examining each reunification case and how they have kept constant cooperation and 
good diplomatic relationships with their neighbouring states, recognised each other's 
sovereignty, formed democratic political atmosphere and economic development, and built trust 
and mutual agreements between the people and the states.243 
A comparative case study analysis between Korea and Germany reveals that if Korea were to 
follow Germany's rapid market-based absorption model, an intolerable social cost and a large 
increase in the economic load for existing and future generations of South Korea could challenge 
                                                     
241 Young-Sun Ji. 2001. Conflicting Visions For Korean Reunification. http://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/conflicting-visions-korean-
reunification. Accessed on 08 April, 2014. p.6. 
242 The North Korean regime is well aware of the bad memories of the trusteeships administered by the US and the USSR from 1945 created a 
divided peninsula for the Korean people. However, during the process of unification, cooperation with outside powers and using their help 
without their interference in Korea's domestic issues in the future is acceptable. South Koreans firmly believe that the unification process should 
be determined by the Korean people themselves.  
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the future of reunified Korea. The Korean post-unification economic impact seems much larger 
than that of Germany because of the bigger gap in productivity between the two Koreas and 
North Korea's much bigger share of unified Korea. The estimated major economic burden on 
South Korea is attributable mainly to the fast increase in social welfare spending for the North 
Korean occupants, rather than to the direct reconstruction cost of the North Korean economic 
system after the disintegration of its Juche and old economic regime. 
The main argument is that these negative socio-economic outcomes can be reduced if the process 
of alteration is gradual such that it exploits freedom and lessens dehumanisation. This social 
development approach to reunification implies building a common social welfare policy regime 
that ensures social rights as an empowerment policy. The German style reunification model can 
still be followed by the South Korean government to mitigate the same problems and mistakes 
that arose during the German reunification process. The probability of making such mistakes can 
be controlled in the reunification process favoured by many South Koreans: that is, a slow 
integration of North Korea and South Korea rather than an "instant reunification" that occurred 
in Germany.  
German style reunification, it seems very improbable that Korean unification will unfold in a 
conflict-free and predictable manner. The main dispute in conceptualising future scenarios on the 
Korean Peninsula is the gap between the final goal and the means to attain it. In sum, a quick and 
peaceful reunification seems impossible, unless the North suddenly collapses; but this would be 
the least preferable option due to its immense repercussions. Without prior normalisation there 
can be no peaceful reunification. Both Koreas should rather focus on the common cultural 
inheritance and understand that the division very much increases their position of dependency. 
Despite the outcomes of predictions and four different scenarios presented in the paper, some 
conclusions can be drawn to guide stakeholder approaches to reunification and beyond. The most 
peaceful method of uniting Korea would be through step-by-step process and gradual integration. 
The step-by-step approach is a "multistage process" that needs some time before the actual 
reunification can occur. It needs active collaboration between both countries and long-term 
planning to gradually restore the national common identity by recreating the economic, political, 
cultural, and social boundaries that segregate the two people.  
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There are three steps to step-by-step unification: the first step is reconciliation (an initial 
acceptance of the status quo by the two Koreas and by four major powers, the US, Japan, China 
and Russia), the second step is cooperation (a formal peace treaty signed by both Koreas to 
facilitate good relations and level each other's economic, political and social policies), and the 
last step is peaceful coexistence (the inter-Korean military relations will be marked through 
reconciliation and cooperation, which will allow personnel exchanges, confidence building and 
greater transparency between the Koreans). 
In order for the step-by-step unification to unfold, the following needs to be addressed: (1) both 
North Korea and South Korea will have to start reflective alterations in approaches and 
suppositions about each other and temporary steps should be introduced to allow bigger 
changes;244 (2) The 1953 Armistice Agreement should be replaced and a permanent peace treaty 
must be signed.245 At the same time, the future of the UN Command, the Combined Forces 
Command, and the subordinate command roles and future missions must be examined and 
reformed; (3) The changed strategic conditions of a reunified Korea would mean that the US 
forces would have to withdraw their troops from the Korean Peninsula and a new security 
mechanism would be positioned to match the development of a consolidated Korean defence 
force;  
(4) Solidarity must ensure co-existence, co-prosperity and common interest for the ultimate goal 
of unification, and; (5) National unification must be implemented by normalising situations 
between the Koreans and establishing a federal nation-state that prevents absorption by either 
side in order to restore mutual trust. As a result, such procedure could lead to cooperation, then 
confederation, and finally unification.246 Simultaneously, the various stages of economic 
transition must not be so slow as to allow the process to deteriorate into "marginal 
incrementalism".247 Instead it must be tight enough to force each side to stretch a little to meet it.  
If both North Korea and South Korea wish to avoid a sudden unification, they must start 
planning for reunification in advance. But first, peaceful unification can be achieved by the 
cessation of armed aggressions, military threat, and ideological oppositions, eventually allowing 
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the creation of a unified Korean state. Second, North Korea and South Korea need to accept each 
other as full negotiating partners and as equal legal entities before starting a chain of 
compromises that would lead to a mutually required political settlement.  
Third, both sides must mutually agree to the settlement, during and after unification process, in 
order to form a functioning, unified state. Fourth, both sides need to come up to terms which are 
agreeable to both sides. Proceeding according to the speed demanded by their political and 
economic contexts, they could ultimately build the common identity needed for the reunification 
procedure.248 Fifth, they need to agree that reunification will be peaceful and non-threatening. 
This means that the military, social and economic aspects of the reunification process must be 
dealt with prior to unification. Sixth, they must use the Chinese model of political development. 
Any attempt to democratise and force to use free market economy in the early stages of the 
reunification process would be threatening to the North Korean regime. And last, the economic 
side of reunification must be realistic and step-by-step process.  
Once reunification is rational, the newly formed country can be controlled in one of the 
following two ways: Firstly, South Korea applying a level of reform to allow North Korea to 
accept Chinese style free market laws in an attempt to apprehend its constricting economy. 
Secondly, the joint national government would be ruled by the South due to its larger population 
and stronger state potentials. Successfully seizing the North Korean nation under this rule, South 
Korea would implement democracy and most probably discard the North Korean system and  
ideology of Juche.  
Regardless of which given scenario derives a unified peninsula, the economic impact on South 
Korea will directly influence, and most probably deduct from the South Korean standard of 
living. Issues based on security and economy will be the two most urgent problems that Korea 
will have to deal with after reunification. How South Korea responds to these challenges will set 
lasting course to the Korean strategic landscape. 
 
 
                                                     
248 Niederhafner, S.     Op. Cit.     p.282. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
76 
 
References 
A Joo Kim, 2010. Analysis on the Reunification Experiences of Germany, Vietnam, and Yemen. 
http://www.sbc.edu/sites/default/files/ Honors/AJooKim.July31_0.pdf. Accessed on March 20, 
2014.  
Ahmed, H. U., Masud, M. H., Faisal, Morshed, N., 2013. "Reunification in Korean Peninsula," in 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. Vol. 4, No. 4. http://www.mcser.org/journal/index. 
php/mjss/article/view/26. Accessed on January 15, 2015. 
Aidan Foster-Carter, 2003. Dr. Corn continues to help Korea heal, in International Herald Tribune. 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-71975228.html. Accessed on April 20, 2014.  
Andrei Lankov, 2012. Continuity and Change in North Korea. http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/ 
Publications2013/Meredith%20paper%20 (edited%20version%202).pdf. Accessed on March 18, 
2014. 
Auerbach, A. J., Chun, Y. J.,  and Yoo, I., 2004. The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunification: A 
Generational Accounting Approach. eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/burden2.pdf. Accessed on 
August 19, 2014. 
Bahk Jaewan (Minister for Strategy and Finance), "Unification from the Perspective of New 
Possibilities in the Korean Economy", dinner speech at the conference Unification and the 
Korean Economy, Seoul, October 21/22, 2012. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_33520-1522-2-
30.pdf?130828104557. Accessed on March 03, 2014.  
Bell, A., 2012. A collection of Partitions. http://archives.jrn.columbia.edu/2011-2012/www.thepalette. 
us//a-collection-of-partitions/. Accessed on November 23, 2014. 
Blum, U., 2011. Can Korea Learn from German Unification? https://ideas.repec.org/p/iwh/dispap/3-
11.html. Accessed on August 20, 2014.  
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
77 
 
Buzo, A., 1997. "Economic Reform in the DPRK," in The Economics of Korean Reunification, Vol. 2, 
No. 1. http://www.econbiz.de/Record/ economic-reform-in-the-dprk-buzo-adrian/10001222374. 
Accessed on April 17, 2014.  
Carpenter, T.G., and Bandow, D., 2004. The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with 
North and South Korea. https://books.google.co.za/books?isbn=1403965455. Accessed on 
January 5, 2015. 
Chamberlin, P.F., 2004. "Cultural Dimensions of Korean Reunification: Building a Unified Society," in 
International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 21, No. 3. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753448. 
Accessed on March 11, 2014.  
Chang Jae-soon, 2014. Park uses European trip for drive to leave legacy on N.Korea. Accessed on 
October 5, 2014. 
Choe Sang-Hun. 2009. Cries and Hugs at Reunion of Families in North Korea. http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/09/27/world/asia/27korea.html?_r=0. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
Chol, K.M., 2001. Kim Jong Il: Day Of Having Korea Reunified. http://library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/ 
read/4015.pdf. Accessed on  August 10, 2014. 
Coghlan, D., 2008. Prospects from Korean Reunification, Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/pub859.pdf. Accessed on April 08, 2014.  
Cortright, D., and Lopez, G., 2005. Bombs, Carrots, and Sticks: The Use of Incentives and Sanctions. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/ 2005_03/Cortright. Accessed on April 20, 2014. 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2013. A Difficult Path - Challenges for a Reunified Korea. http://www. 
defence.gov.au/adc/docs/Publications2013/Meredith%20paper%20(edited%20version%202).pdf. 
Accessed on 19 August 2014. 
Day, S., 2010. The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement. Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_south_ 
movement.pdf. Accessed on August 9, 2014.  
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
78 
 
Defeat of Saigon. http://liviacapnotebook.wikispaces.com/Unit+VIII. Accessed on November 26, 2014. 
Eberstadt, N., 1997. Hastening Korean Reunification: The Writing on the 38th Parallel. http://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/52866/nicholas-eberstadt/ hastening-korean-reunification-the-writing-on-the-38th-
parallel. Accessed on October 10, 2014. 
Encyclopedia Brittanica Blog. 2006. Reflection on the 2000 and 2007 Inter-Korean Summits. 
http://www.britannica.com/blogs/reflections-on-the-2000-and-2007-inter-korean-summits/. 
Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
Eschborn, N. and Young-yoon, K., 2013.Korean Reunification Possibility or Pipe Dream? In KAS 
International Reports. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_33520-1522-2-30.pdf?130828104557. 
Accessed on March 03, 2014.  
George, A.L., 1993. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. http://www.amazon.com/ 
Bridging-Gap-Theory-Practice-Foreign/dp/1878379224. Accessed on April 20, 2014. 
Goodby, J.E., 2006. Creating a Peace Regime in Korea, in The Brookings Institution. www.brookings. 
edu/opinion/2006/05 30northkorea_goodby.aspx. Accessed on May 13, 2014. 
Goohon Kwon, 2009. A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks, in Global Economics Paper 
number 188. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/global_economics_paper_no_188_ 
final.pdf. Accessed on May 04, 2014. 
Government of the Republic of Korea, 2010 White Paper on Korean Unification. http://www.ncnk.org/ 
resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy. 
Accessed on August 16, 2014. 
Gurtov, M., 1996. South Korea's Foreign Policy and Future Security: Implications of the Nuclear 
Standoff in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2760871. Accessed on 
March 11, 2014.   
Harrison, S., 2002. Korean Endgame: a Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement. http://press. 
princeton.edu/titles/7260.html. Accessed on January 18, 2015.  
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
79 
 
Hart-Landsberg, M., Korean Unification: learning from the German experience. http://www.learningace. 
com/doc/1055618/631d13a5e2adc257f8a1405648f36f81/hart-landsberg-korean-reunification. 
Accessed on April 08, 2014.  
Haselden, C. E., 2002. The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast 
Asia. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/02winter/haselden.pdf. 
Accessed on January 15, 2015. 
Hefele, P., Barth, B., and Tensi, J., 2012. Military build-up Dynamics and Conflict Management in East 
and Southeast Asia, in KAS International Reports. http://kas.de/wf/en/33.31266. Accessed on 
June 10, 2014. 
History of Yemen. http://www.yemenweb.com/History.htm. Accessed on August 9, 2014. 
Hwang, K., 1999. "Neutralization: An All-Weather Paradigm for Korean Reunification," in Asian 
Affairs: An American Review. http://cfile237.uf.daum.net/attach/253ED533534B6F46185963. 
Accessed on May 05, 2014.  
Hyeok, J.D., 2013. Unification through Absorprion "Most Likely". https://www.dailynk.com/english/ 
read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1122. Accessed on April 24, 2014. 
ICG Asia Report. 2003. North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy: What Does the DPRK Want? 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/061%20North%20 
Korea%20A%20Phased%20Negotiation%20 Strategy.pdf. Accessed on April 20, 2014.  
Jayshree Bajoria, and Beina Xu.,  2013. The Six Party Talks on Korean Nuclear Program.  http://www.cfr. 
org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593. Accessed on April 11, 
2014. 
Jones, C,. 1990. North-South Korea Talks Produce Freer Dialogue, Summit Proposal. http://www. 
csmonitor.com/1990/0907/ochat.html. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
Jong-Yun Bae, 2010. "South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea: The Evolution of the 
Engagement Policy and Its Impact upon U.S.-ROK Relations," in Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
80 
 
California: University of California Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010. 50.2. 
335. 2014. Accessed on March 20, 2014. 
Jung-Ik Kim, 1996. The Future of the US-Republic of Korea Military Relationship. 
http://www.amazon.com/Future-Us-Republic-Military-Relationship-Jung-Ik/dp/B001UP9X2K. 
Accessed on January 11, 2015.  
Kang, W. I., 2007. The Media-government Relations: Comparative Analysis of the United States, South 
Korea and North Korea's media coverage of foreign policy. https://books.google.co.za/books?id= 
pIvgQsMjqFkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed on January 13, 2014. 
p.103. 
Key Points in Developments in East Asia. Korea as a Colony of Japan (1910-1945). http://afe.easia. 
columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm. Accessed on 22 February 2014. 
Kim, C., and Lee, J., 2013. North Korea warns foreigners to leave South amid new threats of war. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-korea-north-idUSBRE934080 20130409. 
Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
Kim, E., 2014. President Park Geun-hye's Dresden Declaration. http://cogitasia.com/president-park-
geun-hyes-dresden-declaration/. Accessed on August 10, 2014.  
Kim, K. W., 1996. "No Way Out: North Korea's Impending Collapse," in Harvard International Review, 
Vol. 18, No. 2. www.questia.com › ... › Harvard International Review. Accessed on January 17, 
2015. p. 22. 
Kim, S., 2013. Is South Korea Ready for Reunification? http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/24/is-south-korea-
ready-for-reunification/. Accessed on  September 17, 2014. 
Kim, S., 2014. North Korea Spurns Talks for More Family Reunions With South. http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-06/north-korea-rejects-talks-for-more-family-reunions-with-
south.html. Accessed on April 24, 2014. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
81 
 
Kim Hak-Joon, 1993. Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective, in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: 
Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, James Cotton, ed., Canberra: 
Australian National University Press. file:///C:/Users/Ahmet/Downloads/Prospects_Korean_ 
Reunification.pdf. Accessed on April 15, 2014.  
Kim Sung-hwan, 2012. luncheon speech, conference Unification and the Korean Economy, Seoul. 
file:///C:/Users/Ahmet/Downloads/ 1350003912.pdf. Accessed on June 10, 2014. 
Kim Tae-gyu, 2014. Park's 'Dresden Doctrine' faces tough test?. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ www/ 
news/nation/2014/09/180_154914.html. Accessed on October 6, 2014. 
Korean War. http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/korean-war.html. Accessed on April 11, 
2014. 
Kuark, JYT., Economic Impact of Korean Reunification. www.karyiuwong.com/confer/seoul02/papers/ 
kwurk.PDF. Accessed on December 01, 2014. 
Kulacki, G., 2013. U.S. and China See North Korean Problem Differently. http://allthingsnuclear.org/u-
s-and-china-see-north-korean-problem-differently/. Accessed on  January 14, 2015. 
Kyung Won Kim, 1996. "No Way Out: North Korea's Impending Collapse," in Harvard International 
Review, Vol. 18, No. 2. Accessed on April 14, 2014.  
Lankov, A., 2014. China Does Not Want the Korean Peninsula to be Unified. http://www.rfa.org/ 
english/commentaries/parallelt-thoughts/divided-02242014161914.html. Accessed on 0ctober 
10, 2014. 
Lee, C.H., 2004. Reunification of the Two Koreas: An Economic Agenda. www2.hawaii.edu/~ 
lchung/Korea%20Reunification.pdf. Accessed on May 20, 2014.  
Lee Hu-Rak, 1972. Joint Statement of North and South. http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/ 
coree/A/coree72. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
82 
 
Macfie, N., 2010. Factbox: The battles of the Korean West Sea. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/ 
11/29/us-korea-north-clashes-idUSTRE6AS1AL20101129. Accessed on February 22, 2014. 
McCurry, J., 2013. Park Geun-hye takes office as South Korean president. http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/feb/25/park-geun-hye-korean-president. Accessed on October 5, 2014. 
McKercher, B.J.C., 2011. Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft. http://books.google.co.za/ 
books?id=dGypAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA413&lpg=PA413&dq=On+13+December+1991,+the+two
+Koreas+signed+a+%E2%80%9CBasic+Agreement%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=9XXaUuxa
F5&sig=igIah--ji3bTdkVFk7_OOWpqEm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=QelIU7SnKs-V7AafxoCwDQ& 
ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=On%2013%20December%201991%2C%20the%20two%
20Koreas%20signed%20a%20%E2%80%9CBasic%20Agreement%E2%80%9D&f=false. 
Accessed on April 14, 2014. 
Nam, B., Yim, S. C., Yoon, C., and Kang, S., 2011. Why should Korea be reunified? http://pscore.org/ 
files/PSCORE%20-%20Why%20should%20Korea%20be%20reunified.pdf. Accessed on 
January 15, 2015.  
National Unification Board, 1989. To build a national community through the Korean commonwealth. 
http://books.google.co.za/books/about/To_build_a_national_community_through_th.html?id=n6
FxAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y. Accessed on December 01, 2014. 
Niederhafner, S., 2013. "The Challenges of Reunification: Why South Korea Cannot Follow Germany's 
Strategy". Vol. 44, No. 2.  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bZE1iN8n 
DWEJ:www.iks.or.kr/renew/addition/download.asp%3Fftype%3Dissue%26ftb%3Dhm_issue_tb
%26idx%3D1289+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za. Accessed on April 20, 2014.  
Nitikin, M.B., 2009. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues. http://books.google.co.za/ 
books?id=oHSi_zusTU4C&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=vicinity+of+P%27 unggye&source=bl 
&ots=kIFk9CYTGO&sig=RrCQzNM5kiyu2BYUFERDzdwnM3o&hl=en&sa=X&ei=T2hXU7q
uBIud7QbQ3ICgBQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=vicinity%20of%20P'unggye&f=fal
se. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
83 
 
Nixon Shock. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nixon-shock.asp. Accessed on April 11, 2014. 
Noland, M., Economic Strategies for Reunification, in Korea's Future and the Great Powers, Eberstadt 
and Ellings, eds., http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub859.pdf. Accessed on 
April 08, 2014.  
North Korea. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html. Accessed on 
November 23, 2014. 
NSNBC. 2014. 2014 US – South Korean Key Resolve and Foal Eagle beyond War "Games". 
http://nsnbc.me/2014/02/24/2014-us-south-korean-key-resolve-foal-eagle-beyond-war-games/. 
Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
One World Nations Online, History of Yemen. 2012. http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/ 
Yemen-history.htm. Accessed on March 21, 2014. 
Park, Young Ho, 2014. South and North Korea's Views on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula and 
Inter-Korean Relations. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/1/21%20korean%20 
peninsula%20unification/park%20young%20ho%20paper.pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2014.  
Pesek, W., 2007. Viewpoint: Korean Reunification a Costly Pipe Dream, in International Herald 
Tribune. iht.com/bin/print.php?id=7792902. Accessed April 09, 2014.  
Pfennig, W., 2001. Korea and Beyond: National Reunification has International Implications. file:///C:/ 
Users/Ahmet/Downloads/8.1_Pfennig.pdf. Accessed on August 20, 2014. 
Pollack, J.D. and Lee, C.M., 1999. Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications. 
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph.../MR1040.pdf. Accessed on December 12, 
2014. 
Ri Song Chol, the Secretary General of Korean Association of Social Scientists, interviewed by Betul 
Onugoren, at Wits University Johannesburg, October 21, 2014. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
84 
 
Rosenburger, L. R., 1994. "Unifying Korea: Beyond Hopes and Fears," in Contemporary Southeast 
Asia. Vol. 16, No. 3. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/25798252?uid=3738640&uid= 
2&uid=4 &sid=21104315494201. Accessed on April 15, 2014. 
S Korea, DPRK sign joint declaration on peace, prosperity. 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 
2007-10/04/content_6830147.htm. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
Samuel S. Kim, 2006. The Two Koreas and the Great Powers, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
http://www.cambridge.org/asia/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521660631&ss=fro. Accessed 
on April 15, 2014. 
Sang-seek, P., 2014. Korea must work to repair national identity. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php 
?ud=20140817000325. Accessed on September 17, 2014. 
Schaefer, B., 2010. Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy, 1971 -1975. 
http://www.softpanorama.org/Skeptics/group think.shtml. Accessed on August 13, 2014.  
Seidman, B., Korean Reunification. http://www.koreasociety.org/doc_view/888-korean-reunification-
by-seidman-brad. Accessed on March 20, 2014. 
Seung-Ho Joo, 1998. "Korean Foreign Relations Toward The Twenty-First Century: Reunification and 
Beyond," in American Asian Review,". XVI, No. 3. http://books.google.co.za/books?id=9fn 
3e9xfa3sC&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=Seung-Ho+Joo,+%22Korean+Foreign+Relations+ 
Toward+The&source=bl&ots=uJT_teSe0-&sig=q5zblEwM6_le1LL12VQKzD0KS1w&hl=en 
&sa=X&ei=lPw4VJ7-Ms_d7Qbmr4HwDQ&ved= 0CDYQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Seung-
Ho%20Joo%2C%20%22Korean%20Foreign%20Relations%20Toward%20The&f=false. 
Accessed on May 05, 2014. 
Snyder, S., 1999. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. http://www.usip.org/ 
publications/understanding-north-korean-negotiating-behavior. Accessed April 18, 2014. 
Snyder, S., 2003. "Sino-Korean Relations and the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance," in NBR Analysis, 
Vol. 14, No. 1. http://www.nbr. org/publications/element.aspx?id=293. Accessed on May 05, 
2014.  
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
85 
 
Spector, R.H., 2014. Vietnam War. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/628478/Vietnam-War. 
Accessed on October 09, 2014.   
Stahl, A.C., 2001. Operational Planning Issues for the Peaceful Reunification of the Korean Peninsula. 
http://www.ntis.gov/search/product. aspx?ABBR=ADA400766. Accessed on April 14, 2014.  
Stankiewicz, W., 2012. "Interdisciplinary Political And Cultural Journal," in International Studies. Vol. 
14, No. 1. http://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:8080/ xmlui/bitstream/handle/11089/1063/05-stank.pdf? 
sequence=1. Accessed on April 14, 2014.  
Suk-Jin Kim, 2010. Economic Reform in China and Vietnam: Lessons for North Korea. file:///C:/Users/ 
Ahmet/Downloads/Economic%20 Reform%20in%20China%20and%20 Vietnam.pdf. Accessed 
on September 25, 2014. 
Sung Y. Kim, 2012. "ROK-U.S. Relations and Alliance", speech at the 45th Korean Institute for 
Defense Analyses (KIDA) Defense Forum. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_33520-1522-2-
30.pdf?130828104557. Accessed on March 03, 2014.  
Sylblum. 2013. Wings of Desire/Der Himmel über Berlin (Wim Wenders, 1987). http://sylblum. 
wordpress.com/2013/10/19/wings-of-desireder-himmel-uber-berlin-wim-wenders-1987/. 
Accessed on November 26, 2014. 
The Axe murder incident. http://www.tourdmz.com/english/04dmz/p1-4.php. Accessed on April 23, 
2014. 
The editors of encyclopædia of Brittanica. 38th parallel. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
592578/38th-parallel. Accessed on  February 22, 2014. 
The Korean War. http://americainthekoreanwar.weebly.com/korea-divided-at-the-38th-parallel-after-
wwii.html. Accessed on September 25, 2014.  
The National Committee on North Korea. An Overview of Inter-Korean Relations.http://www.ncnk. 
org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy. 
Accessed on February 22, 2014. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
86 
 
Tovar, S.M., 2005. How Will External Powers Affect Korean Reunification? Master's Thesis, Monterey 
CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed on April 14, 2014.   
Tucker, S., 1999. Vietnam. http://books.google.co.za/books?id=WZry2NaH2_sC&pg=PA29&hl= 
en#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed on December 8, 2014. 
US-DPRK "leap day deal" announced. 2012. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/02/29/us-announces-
new-deal-with-dprk/. Accessed on April 23, 2014. 
Wang, Fei-Ling, 1999. "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on 
Korean Reunification," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 167, No. 185. http://connection.ebscohost. 
com/c/articles/2290138/joining-major-powers-status-quo-chinas-views-policy-korean-
reunification. Accessed on August 10, 2014.  
Why did the Korean War break out in 1950? http://www.johndclare.net/EC5.htm. Accessed on March 
08, 2014.    
Wolf, C., Korean Reunification and Reconstruction: Circumstances, Costs, And Implications. 
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/PSA/BS_ Conf06_Wolf.pdf. Accessed on April 14, 2014.  
World Bank. 2014. https://www.google.co.za/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_ 
pop_totl&idim=country:KOR:PRK&hl=en&dl=en. Accessed on January 15, 2015. 
Yemeni Unification. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_unification. Accessed on November 26, 2014. 
Young-Koo Cha, "US-ROK Security Relations: A Korean Perspective", in Robert A. Scalapino & Han 
Sung-joo eds., Untied States-Korea Relations (University of California Press, 1986), 
www.inss.re.kr/inss/attach/getFile.do?fileId=3928. Accessed on January 11, 2015.  
Young-Sun Ji, 2001. Conflicting Visions For Korean Reunification. http://wcfia.harvard.edu/ 
publications/conflicting-visions-korean-reunification. Accessed on 08 April, 2014.  
Yong Man Jo, the North Korean Ambassador in South Africa, interviewed by Betul Onugoren, at Wits 
University Johannesburg, March 26, 2014. 
                                           North Korea-South Korea Relations Towards Successful Reunification                                                 301922 
 
87 
 
Yon-soo Kim, 2014. Korean Reunification in MinneMUN Conference. http://www.tc.umn.edu/~unsa/ 
docs/Background%20guid%20KUC.pdf. Accessed on November 29, 2014. 
Yong-Sup Han, Going Into The "Unification Tunnel": Strategic And Military Implications. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ conf_proceedings/CF152/CF152.chap3.pdf. 
Accessed on August 10, 2014.  
Yu Woo-ik, 2012. Keynote address, conference Unification and the Korean Economy. http://webcache. 
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache: USaqaK25dtUJ:www.unikorea.go.kr/cwsboard/ 
board.do%3Fmode%3Ddownload%26bid%3D1034%26cid%3D19944%26filename%3D19944_
201405142044516910.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za. Accessed on August 10, 2014. 
Zhao, Q. and Sutter, R., 1991. Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam― 
Unification, Conflict Resolution, and Political Development. http://digitalcommons.law.umary 
land.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=mscas. Accessed on December 09, 2014. 
 
